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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Cyber security standards, guidelines, and best practices for control systems are critical 
requirements that have been delineated and formally recognized by industry and 
government entities.  Cyber security standards provide a common language within the 
industrial control system community, both national and international, to facilitate 
understanding of security awareness issues but, ultimately, they are intended to 
strengthen cyber security for control systems.
This study and the preliminary findings outlined in this report are an initial attempt by the 
Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) Standard Awareness Team to better 
understand how existing and emerging industry standards, guidelines, and best 
practices address cyber security for industrial control systems.  The Standard 
Awareness Team comprised subject matter experts in control systems and cyber 
security technologies and standards from several Department of Energy (DOE) National 
Laboratories, including Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories. 
This study was conducted in two parts: a standard identification effort and a comparison 
analysis effort.  During the standard identification effort, the Standard Awareness Team 
conducted a comprehensive open-source survey of existing control systems security 
standards, regulations, and guidelines in several of the critical infrastructure (CI) 
sectors, including the telecommunication, water, chemical, energy (electric power, 
petroleum and oil, natural gas), and transportation - rail sectors and sub-sectors. 
During the comparison analysis effort, the team compared the requirements contained 
in selected, identified, industry standards with the cyber security requirements in “Cyber 
Security Protection Framework,” Version 0.9 (hereafter referred to as the “Framework”).  
For each of the seven sector/sub-sectors listed above, one standard was selected from 
the list of standards identified in the identification effort.  The requirements in these 
seven standards were then compared against the requirements given in the Framework.
This comparison identified gaps (requirements not covered) in both the individual 
industry standards and in the Framework.  In addition to the sector-specific standards 
reviewed, the team compared the requirements in the cross-sector Instrumentation, 
Systems, and Automation Society (ISA) Technical Reports (TR) 99 -1 and -2 to the 
Framework requirements. 
The Framework defines a set of security classes separated into families as functional 
requirements for control system security.  Each standard reviewed was compared to 
this template of requirements to determine if the standard requirements closely or 
partially matched these Framework requirements.  An analysis of each class of 
requirements pertaining to each standard reviewed can be found in the comparison 
results section of this report.  Refer to Appendix A, “Synopsis of Comparison Results,” 
for a complete graphical representation of the study’s findings at a glance. 
Some of the requirements listed in the Framework are covered by many of the 
standards, while other requirements are addressed by only a few of the standards.  In 
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some cases, the scope of the requirements listed in the standard for a particular 
industry greatly exceeds the requirements given in the Framework.  These additional 
families of requirements, identified by the various standards bodies, could potentially be 
added to the Framework.  These findings are, in part, due to the maturity both of the 
security standards themselves and of the different industries’ current focus on security.
In addition, there are differences in how communication and control is used in different 
industries and the consequences of disruptions via security breaches to each particular 
industry that could affect how security requirements are prioritized. 
The differences in the requirements listed in the Framework and in the various industry 
standards are due, in part, to differences in the level and purpose of the standards.
While the requirements in the Framework are fairly specific, many of the industry 
standard requirements are more general in nature.  Additionally, the Framework 
requirements, derived from the “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation,” are component–based, while most of the industry standards are system-
based.
The findings of this study will allow the CSSC Framework Team and the standards 
organizations responsible for the reviewed standards to quickly grasp the relationship 
between their requirements and the Framework, as well as the relationship between 
their standard and other industry sectors.  This will help identify areas for future work in 
developing improved security standards. 
vACRONYMS
ACL Access Control List 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
AGA American Gas Association 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
API American Petroleum Institute 
ATIS Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions 
AWWA American Water Works Association 
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation 
CI Critical Infrastructure 
CIDX Chemical Industry Data Exchange 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CS Cyber Security 
CSMS Cyber-security Management System 
CSR Cyber Security Requirements 
CSSC Control Systems Security Center 
DCS Distributed Control System 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Energy 
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards 
FRA Federal Railroad Administration 
FY Fiscal Year 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICS Industrial Control System 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISA Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society 
ISO International Organization for Standards 
ISMS Information Security Management System 
IT Information Technology 
LAN Local Area Network 
M&CS Manufacturing and Control System 
NERC North American Electric Reliability Council 
NIST U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology 
PCS Process Control System 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
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SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
STOE System Target of Evaluation 
TCSEC Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria 
TOE Target of Evaluation 
TSC TSF Scope of Control 
TSF Technical Security Functions or Trusted Security Functions 
US-CERT United States – Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WISE Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements 
11. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber security standards, guidelines, and best practices (hereafter referred to as 
“standards”) for control systems are critical requirements that have been delineated and 
formally recognized by industry and government entities.  They are the measure by 
which organizations are sometimes judged to be operating in a responsible and legal 
manner.  Standards are the result of work performed by industry specific groups that 
have been judged to be qualified to develop such guidance.  They provide uniform 
guidance to control system equipment providers, vendors, and integrators for 
implementing consistent security approaches and designs into their products, and they 
provide uniform guidance to system operators to ensure safe and secure operation of 
their systems.  Cyber security standards are also used to provide a common language
within the industrial control systems community, both national and international, to
facilitate understanding security awareness issues but, ultimately, they are intended to
strengthen cyber security for control systems.
The success of the Cyber Security Protection Framework effort of the Control Systems 
Security Center (CSSC) will depend on its ability to influence and impact the
advancement of cyber security standards for control systems. 
This study and the preliminary findings outlined in this report are an initial attempt by the 
CSSC Standard Awareness Team to better understand how existing and emerging 
industry standards, guidelines, and best practices address cyber security for industrial 
control systems and to compare these cyber-related standards against the cyber 
security requirements delivered as part of the Cyber Security Protection Framework, 
Version 0.9 deliverable. 
1.1 Framework Overview1
The “Cyber Security Protection Framework, Version 0.9” (hereafter referred to as the 
“Framework”) provides a methodology for consolidating vulnerability mitigation 
measures to enhance the security of process control systems against cyber attack.  It 
supports the CSSC’s mission to reduce cyber security vulnerabilities within control 
systems associated with the nation’s critical infrastructure.  It will provide a tool for 
owner/operators and system vendors to use to assess the security of control systems 
against a database of categorized cyber security requirements.  Each requirement will 
then be supported by graded recommendations for mitigating vulnerabilities.  Figure 1 
shows how the Framework will support the CSSC mission to improve cyber security for 
control systems by involving the control system community. 
                                           
1. Framework description was extracted from the “Framework and Implementation Plan,” Draft – June 8, 2005. 
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Figure 1. Involving Industry in the Solution. 
 The Framework tools will help owner/operators identify the details of their control 
system and the potential consequences of a failure in the system.  The system topology 
and components associated with cyber security are essential to this discovery process.
Once the accurate topology is established, the body of knowledge and logic built into 
the Framework will produce a listing of recommended solutions to meet cyber security 
requirements, component by component.  Requirements are designed to be protective, 
based on the system architecture; recommended solutions are assigned in a graded 
manner commensurate with the potential consequences of a successful attack. 
The Framework will be used to develop assessment tools to evaluate the current 
security profile of a system and as a design tool to design or upgrade a system.  In time, 
with the addition of risk data, the Framework will also be used to prioritize the 
recommendations in terms of greatest risk reduction. 
Assessments help owner/operators and vendors identify and prioritize areas where 
mitigation measures should be applied.  Assessments also allow the CSSC to collect 
system information (market share and sectors) from owners and vendors to assist the 
US-CERT in communicating emerging information about exploits and vulnerabilities to 
the user community.  Assessment findings also support risk analysis efforts to quantify 
impacts and security improvement metrics as mitigation measures are implemented. 
The Framework cyber security requirements are also linked to industry standards, and 
the interface tools will allow the user to assess compliance with a given standard.  Thus, 
the protection Framework provides categorized and graded guidance, component by 
component, for improving control system cyber security. 
31.2 Standards Awareness and Capabilities Task 
This study was conducted in two parts: a standard identification effort and a comparison 
analysis effort.  During the standard identification effort, the Standard Awareness Team 
conducted a comprehensive open-source survey of existing control system security 
standards, regulations, and guidelines in several of the critical infrastructure (CI) 
sectors, including the telecommunication, water, chemical, energy (electric power, 
petroleum and oil, natural gas), and transportation - rail sectors and sub-sectors. 
During the comparison analysis effort, the team compared the requirements contained 
in selected, identified, industry standards with the cyber security requirements in the 
Framework.  For each of the seven sectors/sub-sectors listed, one standard was 
selected from the list of standards identified in the identification effort.  The 
requirements in these seven standards were then compared against the requirements 
given in the Framework.  This comparison identified gaps (requirements not covered) in 
the individual industry standards.  In addition to the sector-specific standards reviewed, 
the team compared the requirements in the cross-sector Instrumentation, Systems, and 
Automation Society (ISA) Technical Reports (TR) 99-1 and -2 to the Framework 
requirements. This effort provides a basic understanding of the relationship between the 
industry standards and the Framework. 
1.3 The Comparison Analysis Effort 
The Framework cyber security requirements are arranged hierarchically, first by class, 
then by family.  For example, the class of requirements named Cryptographic Support 
includes the families Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation.
Each family contains a number of related cyber security requirements. 
Logically, the comparison of a control system security standard to the Framework 
involves sorting each requirement identified by the standard first into the appropriate 
Framework class, then into the appropriate Framework family and, finally, noting 
whether the requirement matches any Framework requirements within that family.  In 
practice, the comparison is not so straightforward. 
Frequently, the Framework cyber security requirements do not express complete 
thoughts or concepts but require further specialization to be precise.  For example, one 
requirement addressing storage of audit files states that, “the TSF shall ensure that 
[assignment: metric for saving audit records] audit records will be maintained when the 
following conditions occur: [selection: audit storage exhaustion, failure, attack].”  To 
determine that a standard requirement matches this Framework requirement, the 
analyst must judge that the standard requirement addresses roughly the same issues 
as the Framework requirement, however it is finally interpreted. 
Another difficulty is that some standards that were compared to the Framework are 
intended to serve as models for organizations developing in-house cyber security 
programs.  These standards tend to provide informative requirements and to designate 
responsibilities.  The Framework requirements, on the other hand, are normative and 
4prescribe capabilities and behaviors of control system components.  Determining a 
match between such different requirements again involves careful judgment. 
Very often standards give words such as “user” a specific meaning not common in 
everyday speech.  For example, American Gas Association Report Number 12 and 
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 define “user” as “an 
individual or process acting on behalf of the individual that accesses a cryptographic 
module in order to obtain cryptographic services.”  However, the Framework defines 
“user” to be “any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE [target of 
evaluation] that interacts with the TOE.”  Additionally, American Gas Association Report 
Number 12 defines the term “operator,” which is not defined in the Framework.  Such 
conflicting definitions and specialized meanings of common words complicate 
comparison of requirements. 
Some of the standards reviewed address cyber security at a higher level than the 
Framework.  And, some standards reviewed are more mature than others or simply 
differ in scope.  For these reasons, and because of the complications just described, the 
comparison results reported below will differ in the amount of detail provided. 
1.4 Origin of Common Criteria 
The nomenclature and catalog of requirements included in the Idaho National 
Laboratory’s Cyber Security Protection Framework for Control Systems were derived 
from the document, System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems2.  The format 
used and requirements delineated in System Protection Profile - Industrial Control 
Systems are based on the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation” (Common Criteria). 
Common Criteria is an international standard that provides: 
x A standard nomenclature for describing both security requirements and the 
security environment of concern. 
x A structured format and required content for describing the security environment. 
x A taxonomy and catalog of security requirements 
x Certified laboratories and processes for evaluating security assurance levels. 
The Common Criteria is the result of an effort to develop an internationally accepted 
framework and criteria for the evaluation of Information Technology (IT) product 
security.  It is a successor to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Orange Book.  The 
Orange Book is one of a series of books published by the National Computer Security 
Center of the U.S. National Security Agency in the 1980s and 1990s.  The series is 
known as the Rainbow Series3 because of their colored covers for each topic.  The 
criteria for evaluating trusted computer products were delineated in the Orange Book 
                                           
2. National Institute of Standards, System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems, Decisive 
Analytics, Version 1.0, April 14, 2004. 
3. http://csrc.nist.gov/secpubs/rainbow/   
5and Red Book.  The Orange Book, first published in 1983 and considered the pre-
eminent book in the series, contains the “Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation 
Criteria” (TCSEC), DoD Standard 5200.28.  Following publication of the Orange Book, 
Germany, Britain, and Canada all issued their own version of the Orange Book.  These 
standards were followed by the development of a unified European standard for security 
evaluations, known as ITSEC.  In 1994, an international effort (U.S., Canada, United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) was initiated to develop an 
international standard for computer system security evaluation criteria.  The Common 
Criteria was the result of this effort.  Version 1.0 of Common Criteria was released for 
public comment in 1996.  Version 2.0 was released in 1998.  Version 2.0 was adopted 
by the International Organization for Standards (ISO) and became ISO 15408 in 1999.
Common Criteria is currently the pre-eminent international standard for computer 
system security evaluation criteria.  Nations formally agree, by signing the Common 
Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA), to accept the results of Common Criteria 
evaluations performed by other CCRA members.  The National Information Assurance 
Partnership administers a security evaluation program in the United States that utilizes 
the Common Criteria as the standard for evaluation.
The catalog of requirements included in the Common Criteria is divided, at the highest 
level, into Functional and Assurance requirements.  Functional requirements relate to 
component or system functions that support IT security.  Assurance requirements relate 
to the “strength” level of functional requirements and the rigor with which security 
functions are implemented and tested. 
The taxonomy within which Common Criteria requirements are specified is illustrated in 
Figure 2.  This taxonomy divides both the Functional and Assurance requirements 
categories into requirements “Classes.”  Classes of requirements share a common 
focus.  There are 11 functional classes and 7 assurance classes of requirements.  
Requirements are further subdivided into Families, Components, and Elements.  
Figure 3 provides an example of the Common Criteria nomenclature used for the 
specification of requirements. 
6Figure 2. Common criteria requirements taxonomy. 
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Component
Number
Element
Number
FIA=
Identification &
Authentication
FIA_UID=
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Timing of
Identification
FIA_UID.1.1=
The TSF shall allow [assignment: list 
of TSF-mediated actions] on  behalf 
of the user to be performed before 
the user is identified
Figure 3. Common Criteria Nomenclature for the specification of requirements.
Two Categories of requirements: 
(1) Functional – 11 classes of 
security functions; e.g., 
cryptographic support, user data 
protection, access 
(2) Assurance – 7 assurance 
classes; e.g., life cycle support, 
tests, vulnerability assessment 
All the members of a Class share a 
common focus.
The members of a class are 
termed Families. A family is a 
grouping of sets of security 
requirements that share 
security objectives but may 
differ in emphasis or rigor.  
Members of a family are termed 
Components. A component is a specific set 
of requirements and the smallest selectable 
set of security requirements included in the 
“catalog” of Common Criteria (CC) 
requirements. Components may be ordered 
to represent increasing strength or capability 
of security requirements or to represent 
related non-hierarchical sets. In some 
instances, there is only one component in a 
family.  
Elements are members of a 
component and cannot be selected 
individually. Elements are explicit 
“shall” statements. 
Category
Class
Family
Component
Element
7The Common Criteria documents state that new requirements may be defined by users 
as necessary.  The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
document System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems4 in fact defines two 
new functional classes, Configuration Management (FCM) and Event Definition (FEM), 
and excludes the Common Criteria functional classes of Communications (FCO) and 
Privacy (FPR). 
Common Criteria is published by both the NIST and the ISO. The current version of the 
Common Criteria standard is Version 2.2, and it consists of three primary documents.
These documents5 encompass the following topics: 
1. Part 1: Introduction and general model (NIST: CCIMB-2004-01-001, ISO: ISO/IEC 
15408-1)
2. Part 2: Security functional requirements (NIST: CCIMB-2004-01-002, ISO: 
ISO/IEC 15408-2) 
3. Part 3: Security assurance requirements (NIST: CCIMB-2004-01-003, ISO: 
ISO/IEC 15408-3). 
Common Criteria Part 2 is effectively a catalog of functional security requirements that 
may be specified for a system or component.  Part 3 is a catalog of security assurance 
requirements.  The Common Criteria establishes specific information assurance goals 
and requires product testing by a laboratory that has been accredited by the National 
Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program.  Products are tested against functional 
security requirements based on predefined Evaluations Assurance Levels defined in 
Part 3 of the standard.  Common Criteria certification is required for hardware and 
software devices used by the federal government on national security systems.  
The Common Criteria continues to evolve. Common Criteria Version 2.2, as well as 
earlier versions, focused on the delineation of standards for security related 
components and did not include system-level requirements critical to the 
implementation of secure systems.  Decisive Analytics has recently published An
Enhanced ISO/IEC 15408 Standard for System Security Specification and Evaluation6
that provides both functional and assurance requirements specifically intended to 
address system security issues and solutions. 
                                           
4. National Institute of Standards, System Protection Profile – Industrial Control Systems, Decisive 
Analytics, Version 1.0, April 14, 2004. 
5. http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/consumer/index.php?menu=2
6. Decisive Analytics, An Enhanced ISO/IEC 15408 Standard for Systems Security Specification and 
Evaluation, Version 1.0, May 12, 2004. 
82. SECTOR STANDARDS REVIEWED 
The Standards Awareness Team searched relevant documents to identify and evaluate 
the requirements and constraints for companies in critical infrastructure sectors that 
imply a control system cyber dependency. 
2.1 Chemical Sector 
A total of 45 documents (standards, best practices, regulatory, and industry-related 
process control and cyber-security guidelines) pertaining to the chemical process 
industry were identified in sub-task I of this project.  Only Chemical Industry Data 
Exchange (CIDX) cyber-security standard “Guidance for Addressing Cybersecurity in 
the Chemical Sector, version 2.0,” was selected for comparison to the Framework. 
The CIDX cyber-security standard was selected for analysis because most of the 
standards, industry best practices, and regulatory requirements identified were very 
general in nature and, therefore, did not provide details with respect to the overall 
Framework cyber-security requirements pertinent to the application of controls in the 
operation of the process and chemical industries.  Performing a comparison on each of 
these standards would have been time-consuming and not cost-effective for this 
analysis. 
The CIDX cyber-security standard differs from other standards in design philosophies, 
operational considerations, corporate risk profile, and policies.  The CIDX cyber-security 
standard provides best practices and guidance to include in corporate policies, 
procedures, and practices.  Elements of cyber-security protection actions and 
information that increases awareness are presented in simple language that can be 
easily understood and adopted by chemical industry members. 
2.2 Energy - Natural Gas Sector 
Sub-task 1 of this project identified 86 standards, best practices, regulatory, and related 
industry process control and cyber security standards pertaining to the natural gas 
industry.  Only American Gas Association (AGA) Report Number 12 (AGA 12), 
Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications, was selected for comparison to 
the Framework.  Specifically, Draft 5 of Part 1:  “Background, Policies and Test Plan,”
was reviewed because it focuses specifically on cyber security of control systems and 
reviewing it was deemed the most cost-effective use of available resources. Part 2: 
“Retrofit link encryption for asynchronous serial communications,” Part 3: “Protection of 
networked systems,” Part 4: “Protection embedded in SCADA components,” and
Addendums: “Key Management, “Protection of Data at Rest,” and “Security Policies” are
forthcoming and were not available for review. FIPS PUB 140-2, “Security 
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” was also examined because it is referenced 
by AGA 12, Part 1, and lends significant support to the document. 
The stated purpose of the AGA 12 series is to recommend a comprehensive system 
designed specifically to protect Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
9system communications.  As such, it addresses an important vulnerability of most 
current SCADA systems—plaintext transmission of control system data over 
unprotected channels between control centers and remote sites.  These systems are 
key components that provide monitoring and control functions associated with much of 
the critical infrastructure in the United States, including natural gas transmission and 
distribution systems. 
2.3 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector  
The requirement under Task II was to review one of the cyber security standards 
identified in Task I and determine its compliance with respect to each discrete 
requirement set forth in the Framework.  Of the 30 security standards related to 
petroleum operations identified in Task I of this project, American Petroleum Institute 
(API) Standard  1164 (API 1164), Pipeline SCADA Security, was selected for 
comparison to the Framework.  Most of the standards identified were not 
comprehensive with respect to the overall Framework requirements.  Performing a 
comparison on each of these standards would have been time-consuming and not 
cost-effective for this analysis.  
API 1164 focuses on defining the responsibilities of authorities and also on prescribing 
the conditions for system access.  It lists the processes used to identify and analyze the 
SCADA system vulnerabilities to unauthorized attacks, and provides a comprehensive 
list of practices intended to harden the core architecture.  The standard appears to 
focus on preventing system compromise, in which case control of losses may be less of 
a concern.  The Framework takes such intrusions into consideration, and significant 
portions of its requirements are aimed at minimizing losses.  
2.4 Transportation-Rail Sector 
A total of 22 standards, guidelines, laws, and best practices for the transportation sector 
were reviewed.  Most of these documents addressed control system cyber security in 
only minimal terms.  The transportation standard selected for review was Transportation
Specification – Standards for Development and Use of Processor-Based Signal and 
Train Control Systems because it seemed to be the standard that had the most 
complete coverage of control system cyber security, although this coverage was still 
quite limited.  This standard was issued by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
as a performance standard for the development and use of processor-based signal and 
train control systems.  It also covers systems that interact with highway-rail grade-
crossing warning systems and establishes requirements for notifying FRA prior to 
installation and for training and recordkeeping.
The transportation sector consists of several sub-sectors:  aviation; passenger rail and 
railroads; highways, trucking, and busing; pipelines; maritime; and mass transit 
systems.  Each of these sub-sectors was considered in selecting a standard for review.
Some of the sub-sectors do not rely on cyber control systems, while with others the 
control system is confidential in nature.  There is a limited amount of cyber control used 
within the rail industry. 
10
The Transportation Specification – Standards for Development and Use of Processor-
Based Signal and Train Control Systems standard was issued to promote the safe 
operation of trains on railroads using processor-based signal and train control 
equipment.  This standard addresses the use of processor-based control systems and 
the concerns related to their use.  This standard was chosen for the following reasons: 
x After reviewing several transportation-related standards, it was determined that 
this one dealt with control system security more completely than the others. 
x Although this standard deals with areas other than control systems, it does 
address processor-based control systems and, hence, does cover some 
common control concerns. 
Control systems used for trains are much different from those used for manufacturing 
plants, chemical refineries, or the electrical distribution systems.  The objective of this 
standard is for processor-based signal and train control systems to meet or exceed the 
safety level of the traditional signal systems they replace.  As a result, new systems 
must be compared by relative performance, and not against a fixed set of requirements.
Therefore, the standard is a performance-based standard that is neutral with regard to 
the technology that implements it.  Because this is a performance-based standard, it is 
not easily compared to the requirements in the Framework, which tends to be 
prescriptive in nature. 
The differences in the standards are due to the differences in the way the systems 
provide control.  Although the railroad system is a processor-based control system, it is 
still primarily a hands-on control system.  The system is mostly hard–wired, with the 
operator always having immediate override capabilities.  For these reasons, many of the 
security classes, such as “Security Alarms” and “Cryptographic Support,” have little 
application on a railroad control system. 
2.5 Cross Sector 
Two cross-sector technical reports were reviewed for the comparison study.  These 
reports, published by ISA (Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society) are ISA-
TR99.00.01-2004 (TR99-01), Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control 
Systems, and ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 (TR99-02), Integrating Electronic Security into the 
Manufacturing and Control System (M&CS) Environment.  These reports, which are 
precursors to standards for the cyber security of manufacturing and control systems 
(M&CS), are informative in nature, describing areas that should be considered when 
setting up an M&CS cyber security system. 
Manufacturing and control systems are found in many organizations within the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.  The two reports reviewed provide common ground in analyzing 
and securing the cyber component of M&CS, independent of the type of organization or 
the sector with which it is aligned. 
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These reports were issued to promote the safe and secure operation of M&CS by 
identifying best practices, as determined by representatives of organizations within a 
wide variety of sectors.  These two reports were chosen for the following reasons: 
x They are sector cross-cutting reports dealing primarily with the cyber security of 
manufacturing and control systems. 
x They are supported by representatives of organizations from many of the critical 
infrastructures. 
x They delineate baseline cyber security requirements dealing with manufacturing 
and control systems. 
Strictly speaking, these are not standards but technical reports. However, they still 
provide much the same information, with less detail, as the follow-on standards will 
provide.  As cross-sector documents, they are more generic in nature than many other 
standards.  Their primary focus is on manufacturing and control systems, so they do not 
address some special areas of concern.  These are high-level documents that identify 
high-level concerns and present possible solutions, while not addressing specific lower-
level requirements.  They are also informative, or performance based in nature, which 
makes it more difficult to compare them to prescriptive, low-level, requirement-based 
standards.
2.6 Energy - Electric Power Sector 
A total of 84 cyber security standards, guidelines, and industry best practices were 
identified in the electric/energy sector.  Most of these were very general in nature or 
only covered a portion of the material contained in the Framework.  The North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) series 
(Draft 3) was selected for this effort because:  
1. It is the most complete and thorough standard. 
2. Industry is currently working on the standard. 
3. It covers some areas that are not in the first version of the Framework, providing 
for a more complete comparison study. 
NERC is a voluntary organization whose mission is to ensure that the bulk electric 
system in North America is reliable, adequate, and secure.  The component of NERC 
responsible for the CIP standard is the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee. 
The sections contained in the NERC CIP series are: 
x CIP-002-1 Critical Cyber Assets 
x CIP-003-1 Security Management Controls 
x CIP-004-1 Personnel & Training 
x CIP-005-1 Electronic Security 
x CIP-006-1 Physical Security 
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x CIP-007-1 Systems Security Management 
x CIP-008-1 Incident Reporting and Response Planning 
x CIP-009-1 Recovery Plans. 
Within each CIP section, requirements are labeled with an R followed by a number, and 
measurements are labeled with an M followed by a number.  In Section 3 of this report, 
the section identifier and requirement or measurement is listed.  For example, CIP-008-
1 R1 means requirement 1 from section CIP-008-1. 
The NERC CIP series aligns nicely with the viewpoint that cyber security is addressed 
through the application of three categories of controls:  management, operational, and 
technical.  Management controls include items such as risk assessment, personnel 
screening, etc. Operational controls include items such as backup procedures, 
configuration management procedures, backup power, etc.  Technical controls include 
the specific hardware and software used to counter cyber threats.  Examples of 
technical controls are firewalls, intrusion detection systems, anti-virus software, etc.  In 
applying these tools, an organization should first understand their security problem —
that is, what needs to be protected, what it needs to be protected from, and why it 
needs to be protected.  This analysis should be built using some form of risk 
management and analysis methodology.  The Framework focuses on technical controls 
that have been identified through analysis of security requirements for a generic 
industrial control system.  The NERC CIP series, on the other hand, addresses all three 
categories of security controls. 
2.7 Telecommunications Sector 
A total of 31 industry and federal government cyber security-related telecommunications 
standards and requirements were reviewed.  Many of these standards relate to very 
specific and limited telecommunications services.  Because it was impossible to review 
all cyber security-related telecommunications standards, the review effort attempted to 
focus on those telecommunications standards that were not service specific. 
ANSI standard T1.276-2003, Operations, Administration, Maintenance, and 
Provisioning Security Requirements for the Public Telecommunications Network:  A 
Baseline of Security Requirements for the Management Plane, was selected for 
comparison to the Framework requirements.  T1.276 was chosen because: 
x It is an ANSI accredited standard. 
x The T1 committee that developed this standard is an industry group sponsored 
by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS). 
x The standard delineates a set of baseline security requirements for the 
telecommunications management plane.  The management plane includes the 
operation, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P) systems for 
network elements and various supporting systems. 
ATIS is a U.S.-based organization funded by the telecommunication industry.  ATIS 
develops technical and operations standards for communications and related 
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information technology industries, worldwide.  The original version of T1.276 was 
developed by the Security Requirements Working Group (SRWG) established in 2002 
by the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.  SRWG 
was tasked with developing standards that could help ensure the security of 
telecommunication network management functions.  At the conclusion of their effort, the 
SRWG recommended to the President that the underlying principles delineated by the 
working group be applied to the computing elements of other critical infrastructures. 
T1.276 specifies requirements as mandatory (M) or as security objectives (O).  The 
delineated requirements are intended to address the following principles of OAM&P 
security:
x Secure management traffic with strong encryption and authentication.
x Authenticate and attribute all management actions. 
x Manage security resources and configurations with integrity. 
x Maintain logs for all of the above. 
x Support least privilege. 
x Support security alarms. 
T1.276 defines six “categories” of security requirements.  These are: 
x Cryptographic Algorithms and Keys 
x Authentication 
x Administration 
x Network Element/Management System Use and Operation 
x Communications 
x Network Element/Management System Development and Delivery. 
2.8 Water Sector 
The water sector standard reviewed for this application was taken from the American 
Water Works Association’s (AWWA) Security Guidance for Water Utilities.  This 
document was developed to address a number of unpredictable acts that could hinder 
the operations of water utilities.  Section 5, Cyber Security Management, Operations, 
and Design Considerations, is focused specifically on acts that affect the cyber security 
of a utility.  This document was chosen because: 
x It was produced under a cooperative agreement with the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to improve infrastructure security. 
x It has been reviewed by members of the Water Infrastructure Security 
Enhancements (WISE) Standards Committee. 
x It was reviewed by various AWWA divisions to ensure the ideas will work for a 
wide range of utility configurations and sizes. 
14
This document focuses on process control systems in general. None of its statements 
provide any hint that process control systems (PCS) in the water sector have any 
special requirements for proper operation.
The AWWA is an international, nonprofit organization whose focus is the supply, 
treatment, and distribution of the nation’s drinking water.  This standard was created to 
specifically address related concerns. Both the Water Environment Federation and the 
American Society of Civil Engineers have also taken part in this effort, creating 
standards corresponding to the wastewater systems and contamination detection and 
monitoring systems, accordingly. 
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3.  COMPARISON RESULTS 
In each sub-section, comparison results are reported by Framework class and family of 
cyber security requirements.  Each sub-section summarizes the results for a Framework 
class using a table, such as the following: 
Cryptographic Support 
 Cryptographic 
Key
Management 
Cryptographic 
Operation
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match
In this table,  indicates that the standard reviewed does not adequately address the 
requirements of the Framework family identified in the column heading,  indicates that 
the standard reviewed only partly addresses the requirements of the Framework family, 
and  indicates that the standard reviewed mostly or completely addresses the 
requirements of the Framework family. 
There are several ways to read these tables.  First, reading by row it is possible to get a 
sense of the maturity and scope of the security standard reviewed for each sector.
Where all entries in a row are  except one or two, there are likely to be marginal 
improvements that can be made in that standard to address remaining cyber security 
concerns.  Second, reading by column it is possible to identify cyber security concerns 
standards organizations may need to address where, for example, all or most of the 
column entries are .  Also reading by column, one sector may find an existing 
standard adopted by another sector that addresses some family of requirements related 
to the family that it has yet to address.
There are some caveats to keep in mind when reviewing these tables.  First, the tables 
report only the state of control systems security standards in relation to the Framework, 
and they do not report the state of control systems security practice.  Even if a table row 
is marked , indicating that a sector has not adequately addressed a class of 
Framework cyber security requirements, companies in that sector may, in practice, fully 
satisfy the requirements.  Also, it may be that including company proprietary practices 
and operational requirements would change a  to a .  Finally, the standards 
compared against the Framework cyber security requirements have, in most cases, 
been thoroughly reviewed and adopted, whereas the Framework is still in development.  
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The comparison results below should not be taken as a judgment for or against any 
existing standard, but only as an honest attempt to understand the relation of each 
standard reviewed to the Framework. 
Refer to Appendix A: “Synopsis of Comparison Results,” for a complete graphical 
representation of the study’s findings.
3.1 Common Acronyms 
Each class and family of Framework cyber security requirements is identified both by 
written word and by a three letter acronym, for example, Security Audit (FAU) and Audit 
Data Generation (GEN).  Specific cyber security requirements are identified by class, 
family, and number as in FAU_GEN.1.  Also, the following common acronyms are used 
throughout the comparison results: 
x STOE or TOE– System Target of Evaluation or Target of Evaluation (TOE) 
x TSF – Technical Security Functions or Trusted Security Functions 
x TSC – TSF Scope of Control. 
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3.2 Class:  Security Audit (FAU) 
Security Audit 
Security
Alarms 
Audit Data 
Generation 
Potential
Violation
Analysis
Audit
Review 
Selective
Audit
Potential
Audit Trail 
Storage
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
       
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.2.1 Family Definitions 
x Security Alarms (ARP) - This family defines the responses to be taken for 
detected events indicative of a potential security violation.  
x Audit Data Generation (GEN) - This family defines requirements for recording the 
occurrence of security relevant events that take place under TSF control, 
including identifying the user that caused the event.
x Potential Violation Analysis (SAA) - This family defines requirements for 
automated means that analyze system activity and audit data looking for possible 
or real security violations and also includes profile-based anomaly detection and 
attack heuristics. 
x Audit Review (SAR) - This family defines the requirements for audit tools that 
should be available to authorized users to assist in the review of audit data and 
also includes restricted and selectable audit reviews. 
x Selective Audit (SEL) - This family defines requirements to select the events 
(include or exclude) to be audited during STOE operation.  
x Protected Audit Trail Storage (STG) - This family defines the requirements for the 
TSF to be able to create and maintain a secure audit trail. It also includes 
guarantees of audit data availability and actions for and prevention of audit data 
loss.
3.2.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standards Version 2.0 
3.2.2.1 Security Alarms, Audit Data Generation, Audit Review, Selective Audit, 
and Potential Audit Trail Storage
The CIDX cyber-security standard provides general guidelines for vigilance against 
security breaches.  It provides the user with guidance for reporting, deterring, protection, 
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developing security policies, etc., to protect the system from future intrusion.  The 
document also defines and describes this process in general terms and emphasizes 
incident planning and response action.  The plan recommends steps to take in keeping 
track of incidents, investigations, recording, tracking, and learning from each incident to 
develop action plans for securing the known security breaches.  The CIDX standard, 
under Auditing Process, discusses audit tools for tracking software patches, etc., but 
does not recommend tools for control system devices subject to system failure from 
automated scanning. 
3.2.2.2 Potential Violation Analysis
Under the Framework requirement (FAU_SAA.1.1), the TSF shall be able to apply a set 
of rules for monitoring the audited events and, based on these rules, indicate a potential 
violation of the TSP.  The CIDX cyber-security standard does not provide details on how 
to monitor events.  Guidance is very general in nature and, therefore, may not 
adequately satisfy the Potential Violation Analysis class (SAA) requirements.  In 
addition, under potential violation rules, the standard does not provide or define a 
profile-based anomaly mechanism, nor does it provide an automated response to 
security violations.  This is a gap from the Framework requirements. 
3.2.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.2.3.1 Security Alarms, Audit Data Generation, and Selective Audit 
AGA 12, Part 1, requires collection and reporting of usage and forensic data to provide 
an audit trail of critical actions and events.  However, it does not specify the level of 
detail contained in the Framework.  For example, AGA 12, Part 1, requires that 
information needed to legally prosecute cyber attackers be recorded.  It can be inferred 
that this includes such things as the date and time an event occurred, although this is 
not explicitly stated.  Therefore, the intent of AGA 12, Part 1, is deemed to correspond 
in large part with the Framework. 
3.2.3.2 Audit Review 
Although the interpretability of data is not specifically addressed, this is implied by the 
AGA 12, Part 1, requirement that the data be “made available.”  The Framework audit 
review requirements are partially met because availability should also include 
requirements for accessible data for useful purposes and presentation in 
understandable terms.  Explicit read access to audit data does not appear to be 
required, and selectable audit review is not addressed. 
3.2.3.3 Potential Violation Analysis and Protected Audit Trail Storage 
As stated previously, AGA 12, Part 1, was deemed to comply with the intent of the 
Framework, although most of the required detail is missing.  Since authorized access 
and availability for audit purposes is specified, it can be inferred that unauthorized 
modification or deletion would be prohibited.  The detail needed to address the 
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discrepancies in this area may be included in forthcoming parts of the AGA 12 
document.
3.2.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.2.4.1 Security Alarms 
Virtually all existing control systems incorporate audible and/or visible alarms as a basic 
security detail.  Surprisingly, there is no mention of such alarms in API 1164.  One 
exception found is a door remaining open for an excessive period. This standard does 
provide some detail on event monitoring, mostly related to information flow and data 
retention for future audit.  This is a gap in the API standard, denoting non-compliance. 
3.2.4.2 Audit Data Generation and Audit Review 
The provisions of API Standard Number 1164 closely match the requirements for 
auditing.  The standard provides for the generation of audit records for all user activity, 
maintenance of the records for a specified (by the operator) time, review only by 
authorized personnel, implementation of intrusion detection capabilities, and also 
assignment of responsibility for oversight.  The API Standard is in compliance with the 
audit generation requirements. 
3.2.4.3 Potential Violation Analysis 
API 1164 addresses most of the requirements covered in this family.  However, its 
provisions are not designed to identify potential violations through the use of profiling 
techniques, such as analysis of user historical patterns.  Thus, the standard has a 
compliance level of approximately 67% in meeting these requirements.
3.2.4.4 Selective Audit and Protected Audit Trail Storage 
These two sub-class requirements are partially satisfied in API 1164. The standard 
provides no provision for varying audit requirements based on a discerned difference in 
user attributes, such as the size, speed, and complexity of different user systems.  The 
standard prohibits the modification of data collected from the Industrial Control System 
(ICS) for audit purposes, but does not require the system to detect these modifications.  
Nor does it require the system to maintain audit records.  Instead these are made a 
responsibility of the staff and supervision, but without stipulating how this is to be 
accomplished.
3.2.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.2.5.1 Security Audit – FAU 
None of the requirements listed under the Security Audit class (FAU) in the Framework 
are addressed in the transportation standard.  This may be due to the differences in 
emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control 
systems are used. 
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3.2.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004
3.2.6.1 Security Alarms 
Security alarms (FAU-ARP) are addressed in Sections 8.3 and 8.3.1 of the standard 
covering intrusion detection systems and alarms.   
3.2.6.2 Audit Data Generation 
Audit data generation (FAU-GEN) is partly covered by TR99-01 in Sections 6.1.4 and 
6.1.6, which address event logging.
3.2.6.3 Potential Violation Analysis 
Potential violation analysis (FAU-SAA) is addressed to a minimal extent in Sections 8.1, 
8.3, and 8.3.2, which address reviewing event for intrusion detection.  Section 9.1.6 
addresses providing a full security audit trail, and 8.2 indicates that a detection system 
must be comprehensive enough to cover all the possible ways a file can enter a system.
Sections 8.3 and 8.3.1 discuss immediate alarms to security personnel.  Additional 
areas covered by TR99-01 that are not addressed in the Framework but fall under this 
general topic include audit planning and log maintenance in Section 8.1, and virus 
detection systems in Sections 8.2.3, 8.2.4, and 8.2.6. 
3.2.6.4 Audit Review 
Audit review (FAU-SAR) audit log organization is addressed in Section 8.1 of TR99-01.
In addition, Section 8.1.3 addresses scripting and management of log auditing tools. 
3.2.6.5 Selective Audit 
Selective audit (FAU-SEL) is not addressed in TR99-01. 
3.2.6.6 Protected Audit Trail Storage 
Protective audit trail storage (FAU-STG) audit file protection is covered in Section 10.1.2 
of TR99-01.  Section 9.1.6 discusses file checking for signs of tampering, and 
Sections 8.1 and 9.1.6 cover recording critical events in the audit logs.  Additionally, 
Section 10.2.6 addresses protecting sensitive documents, a topic not addressed in the 
Framework.
3.2.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.2.7.1 Security Alarms 
Security alarms (FAU-ARP) are addressed in Sections 18.11, 18.12.1, and 18.12.3 of 
the standard covering intrusion detection and alarms. 
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3.2.7.2 Audit Data Generation 
Audit data generation (FAU-GEN) is partly covered by TR99-02 in Sections 6.6.6 
and 18.10, which address event logging and the examination and monitoring of system 
logs.
3.2.7.3 Potential Violation Analysis 
Potential violation analysis (FAU-SAA) is addressed in Section 18.10, which covers 
examination and monitoring of system logs, and Sections 18.11, 18.12.1, and 18.12.2, 
which address intrusion detection notification and documentation of events or incidents.
Sections 10.2.4 and 18.11 address intrusion detection. 
3.2.7.4 Protected Audit Trail Storage 
Protective audit trail storage (FAU-STG) is covered in Sections 6.6.8.4 and 6.7.4 of 
TR99-02.  They discuss development of policies for communication and operations 
management and backing up vital data.  Additionally, Sections 18.4, 18.5, and 18.6 
address the audit planning, expression of audit results, and sending performance 
metrics to appropriate stakeholders—topics not addressed in the Framework. 
3.2.7.5 Selective Audit and Audit Review 
None of the remaining families listed under the Security Audit class (FAU) in the 
Framework are addressed in TR99-02.  This is probably due to the differences in area 
of emphasis between the two documents.
3.2.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.2.8.1 Security Alarms, Audit Data Generation, Potential Violation Analysis, 
and Audit Review 
Security Alarms requirements are addressed primarily in CIP-008-1 R3.  Under R3, an 
entity must define incident response actions and communication plans.  The response 
and communication plans can be written to include alarms in audible or visual form, 
satisfying FAU_ARP. 
 Audit data generation requirements, FAU_GEN, are addressed primarily in 
CIP-007-1 R7.  Under R7, an entity must ensure it is possible to create an audit trail 
from logs of security-related events affecting critical cyber assets.  Logs in R7 refer to 
system logs, logs generated from monitoring systems, such as an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS), and/or physical access logs for areas where automated logs are not 
available.
Numerous potential violation analysis requirements, FAU_SAA, are addressed, 
primarily in CIP-003-1, CIP-007-1, and CIP-008-1.  Requirements for detecting, 
assessing, reporting, and gathering signatures for specific events, as well as defining 
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roles for assuming responsibility, are all defined in the associated requirements and 
measures.
Audit review requirements, FAU_SAR, are addressed in numerous NERC CIP sections, 
including CIP-003-1 R5, CIP-007-1 R3, and CIP-008-1 R3.  Access to audit information 
is controlled by roles with the CIP standard.  In addition, CIP-008-1 identifies the types 
of audit data to be captured.  Assessment is mentioned, but the CIP is not specific 
regarding filtering methods. 
3.2.8.2 Selective Audit 
Requirements in the NERC CIP address generating, analyses, and storage of audit 
data, but there is no provision in the NERC CIP for selective audit capabilities. This 
capability is neither allowed nor prohibited by the requirements and measurements in 
the CIP. 
3.2.8.3 Protected Audit Trail Storage 
CIP-008-1 and CIP-003-1 indicate a partial match with requirements contained in 
FAU_STG.  There is no requirement in the CIP for redundant storage of audit files, but 
retaining audit files for a specified time and protecting audit files from change are 
addressed. 
3.2.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.2.9.1 Audit Data Generation 
T1.276 specifies two requirements that closely match two audit data generation 
requirements.  T1-276 requirements M-35 and M-37 closely match FAU_GEN.1.1 and 
FAU_GEN.1.2, respectively.  In addition, T1.276 states an audit data generation 
requirement and an objective that are not included in the Framework requirements.
Objective O-2 specifies that the system should provide the capability to configure the 
critical security administration actions that are to be included in the security log.
Requirement M-36 specifies that the system shall be capable of remote logging over a 
trusted path.
3.2.9.2 Security Alarms, Potential Violation Analysis, Audit Review, Selective 
Audit, and Protected Audit Trail Storage 
T1.276 does not include requirements that are a close match to the remaining Security 
audit family requirements.
3.2.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.2.10.1 Security Alarms, Audit Review, and Selective Audit 
The AWWA standard has very light requirements for auditing process control systems.  
It requires that Human Machine Interface (HMI) processes log files that are associated 
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with user logon credentials with actions and changes made to HMI (creating a non-
refutable audit trail of operator actions).  It also states that the log files shall be reviewed 
for inappropriate activity, but does not specify a timeframe for this process.  The 
standard fails to recommend that specific actions, such as system shutdown, be 
included in the logs or that the logs contain proper date and time stamps.  The standard 
does state to install an intrusion detection system (IDS) at the Internet gateway and 
regularly audit IDS logs for evidence of unauthorized entry.  Since many IDS systems 
use a rule set to perform their analysis, this statement could align with some of the 
requirements in FAU_SAS.  
3.2.10.2 Audit Data Generation, Potential Violation Analysis, and Protected Audit 
Trial Storage 
The AWWA standard states that appropriate tapes should be stored offsite to ensure 
disaster recovery, but it does not state that the audit trail is part of these backups.  This 
makes it difficult to determine whether there is any coverage of family FAU_STG. 
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3.3 Class:  Configuration Management (FCM ) 
Configuration Management 
Security 
Alarms 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.3.1 Family Definitions 
 Identification Information (IDI) - This family defines the requirements for 
Configuration Management (CM) as they apply to the PCS for as-built 
documentation, vendor manuals, drawings, set points, limits, etc.  It also includes 
requirements for change control, design, testing, implementation, and review and 
approval processes. 
3.3.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.3.2.1 Identification Information 
The CIDX cyber-security standard provides guidance for a Cyber-security Management 
System (CSMS) that includes the following:  
 Information systems - including all operating systems, data bases, applications of 
the company, including joint ventures, and other third party business activities 
 Manufacturing and control systems - including all PCS, SCADA, Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLCs), Distributed Control Systems (DCS), configuration 
workstations, and plant or lab information systems for both real-time and historical 
data
 Networks, local area networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs) - including 
hardware, applications, firewalls, intrusion detection systems 
 Integration points with value chain partners 
 User responsibilities - including policies to address authentication and audit, and 
Information protection, including access requirements and individual accountability. 
25
The information is in general terms and explains user identification, management and 
authentication techniques, etc., and, therefore, can meet the Framework controls 
security requirement, though not in the exact terminology identified under the criteria. 
3.3.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.3.3.1 Identification Information 
Minimum requirements for a configuration management system are specified in the 
AGA 12.  Some of the details included in the Framework, such as management of 
action lists and user identities, are not addressed. 
3.3.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.3.4.1 Identification Information 
API 1164 provides extensive and explicit configuration management requirements that 
appear to exceed the requirements of the Framework. It is very specific with respect to 
authorization, documentation, testing, etc.  The standard satisfies the Identification 
Information requirements very well. 
3.3.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.3.5.1 Identification Information – FCM 
CM Identification information (FCM-IDI) partly covers four of the requirements listed in 
Configuration Management Identification Information (FCM-IDI) of the Protection of 
System Configuration class.  Section 236.18 of the transportation standard addresses a 
management control plan aimed at ensuring that the proper hardware and software are 
in use.  In addition, Section 236.18 discusses the use of a Software Management 
Control Plan. 
3.3.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004  
3.3.6.1 Identification Information 
CM Identification information (FCM-IDI) is partly covered by Section 10.1.4 of TR99-01, 
which addresses mapping of security areas under access control.  In addition, TR99-01 
covers the need to extensively document and maintain scripts in Section 8.1.3. 
3.3.7 Cross Sector – ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.3.7.1 Identification Information 
CM identification information (FCM-IDI) is covered in TR99-02 by the following sections: 
x Section 6.4.4 — Addresses the assessment and classification of vital information 
based on consequences of loss, damage, or failure 
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x Section 6.7 — Addresses that the change management plan should identify 
components within the security boundary 
x Section 8.2.2 — Addresses the development of a network diagram of the system 
x Section 6.7.4 — Addresses maintaining documentation of system security 
aspects
x Section 18.3 — Addresses establishing a change management program 
x Sections 6.7.4 and 17 — Addresses reviewing proposed changes, performing 
system validation testing after changes, and communicating changes to the 
proper stakeholders 
x Sections 6.6.3 and 6.6.8.2.2 — Addresses defining user roles and responsibilities 
and the development of policies for user responsibilities 
x Sections 6.6.2 and 6.7.4 — Covers the need to define the hardware and software 
within the security perimeter and to assess and test the vulnerability of the 
security boundary 
x Sections 6.5, 6.6.6, and 6.7 — Address the need for change management control 
x Sections 6.5, 6.7.4, 12.1, and 17 — Address testing 
x Section 6.6.6 — Address training. 
3.3.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.3.8.1 Identification Information 
Between CIP-002-1, CIP-003-1, and CIP-007-1, all of the requirements in FCM_IDI are 
addressed, with the exception of FCM_IDI.1.5 and the database requirement contained 
in FCM_IDI.1.2.  The provisions in the CIP adequately address a configuration 
management process, the identification of critical assets, defining secure settings, and 
system/sub-system documentation. 
3.3.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.3.9.1 Identification information 
Three T1.276 requirements and one objective relate to configuration management, 
however, these requirements/objectives differ from those specified in the Framework.
M-66 requires the system to be able to electronically determine current hardware and 
software revision levels and validate appropriate configurations.  M-64 requires all new 
software to have cryptographic authentication and integrity protection mechanisms.  O-3 
states that all receiving software should be capable of interpreting the cryptographic 
authentication and integrity protection mechanisms.  M-65 requires that all software 
updates be transmitted over a trusted path. 
3.3.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.3.10.1 Identification Information 
The AWWA standard states that the utility should install third-party software or upgrade 
current HMI versions to enable change propagation capability that monitors revisions to 
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programming, including changes to both date/time and login credentials.  This software 
can also “undeploy” programming changes and revert to a previous version. This 
statement provides partial coverage of the FCM_IDI family.  There is no mention of a 
broad configuration management system or method for organizing documents relating 
to system configuration. 
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3.4 Class:  Cryptographic Support (FCS) 
Cryptographic Support 
Cryptographic 
Key
Management 
Cryptographic 
Operation
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.4.1 Family Definitions 
x Cryptographic Key Management (CKM) - This family includes the requirements 
to manage cryptographic keys through their lifecycle, including the following 
activities: cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, 
cryptographic key access, and cryptographic key destruction.
x Cryptographic Operation (COP) - This family includes requirements for 
cryptographic operation to function correctly, including specifying the algorithms 
and key sizes for the STOE.
3.4.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.4.2.1 `Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
The CIDX cyber-security standard recommends using available encryption technology, 
key generation, and management practices, but does not clearly include the details, as 
required in the Framework.  The standard cites two standards for system administration, 
which include the use of cryptographic technology prescribed under ISO/IEC- 17799: 
ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 and NIST PCSRF ICS-SPP.  From the analysis, it can be 
concluded that if the user follows the other standards for cryptographic support, the 
CIDX cyber-security standard will meet some of the Framework security requirements.
3.4.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.4.3.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
AGA 12, Part 1, proposes the use of encryption to secure SCADA data 
communications, and it addresses many of the details specified in the Framework, 
including a secure key management system and cryptographic algorithms approved by 
NIST.  It also requires that cryptographic modules be FIPS 140-2 compliant and 
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recommends certification.  Any remaining disparities may be addressed in the 
comprehensive key management specification to be published in AGA 12, Part 1, 
Addendum 1. 
3.4.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.4.4.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
API 1164 recommends encryption in certain cases, and mandates it in others.
However, it lacks the detail necessary for a comprehensive security design.  At a 
minimum, a reference to some existing encryption standard, including key management, 
should have been included.  Possible references include Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) publications for Data Encryption Standard (DES) or 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).  The standard has a gap in meeting the 
requirements of this class.
3.4.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.4.5.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
None of the requirements listed under the Cryptographic Support class (FCS) in the 
Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  No references to 
cryptographic-based security measures were found.  This is probably due to the lack of 
need for encryption of the control data, as well as the differences in emphasis between 
the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control systems are used.
3.4.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.4.6.1 Cryptographic Key Management 
Cryptographic key management (FCS-CKM) is extensively covered in Sections 7.1.6, 
“Cryptographic Key Establishment,” 7.1.2 and 7.1.6, “Key Deployment,” and 7.2, ”Secret 
and Public Key.”  Sections 10.1.6 and 10.2.6 address management policy.  In addition, 
TR99-01 addresses hardware and software based on cryptography.
3.4.6.2 Cryptographic Operation
Cryptographic operation (FCS-COP), as described in the Framework, is not addressed 
in TR99-01.  It does cover several other requirements that are not addressed in the 
Framework dealing with cryptographic operation, including key changes (Section 7.1.3), 
protection of encryption hardware (Section 7.1.6), protection against replay and forging 
(Section 7.1.6), use of a good quality random number generator (Section 7.1.6), 
protection of the private key (Section 7.2), and thorough testing of the cryptographic 
system (Section 7.4.6). 
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3.4.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.4.7.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation
None of the requirements listed under the Cryptographic Support class (FCS) in the 
Framework document are addressed in the TR99-02.  This is probably due to the 
differences in emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in 
which the control systems are used.  TR99-02 does address providing encryption where 
appropriate (Section 10.2.3).
3.4.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.4.8.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
The provisions of the NERC CIP standard do not contain any requirements to match the 
FCS family.  In fact, the word cryptography is not even in the standard.  Confidentiality 
is not the primary focus area in the electric sector; instead, the focus is on availability 
and integrity.  
3.4.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.4.9.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
T1.276 requirements relating to cryptographic key management are very similar to the 
requirements delineated in the Framework; however, the requirements delineated in 
T1.276 are more specific.  T1.276 provides specific requirements for key strength (M-6), 
in addition to specific standards for secure key generation and management (M-7).
Keys must be distributed out of band or by secure cryptographic processes, as specified 
in (M-8). 
T1.276 requirements for cryptographic operation are also very similar to the 
requirements delineated in the Framework, and the T1.276 requirements are more 
specific.  T1.276 specifies encryption standards to be implemented (M-1).  Specific 
algorithms are also required for symmetric (M-4) and asymmetric (M-5) data integrity 
applications.
3.4.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.4.10.1 Cryptographic Key Management and Cryptographic Operation 
The AWWA standard does not include information about the methodologies to 
generate, use, or destroy cryptographic keys; it does not appear to cover this class. 
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3.5 Class:  User Data Protection (FDP) 
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 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.5.1 Family Definitions 
x Subset Access Control (ACC) - This family identifies the access control security 
function policies and defines the scope of control of the policies that form the 
identified access control portion of the TSP.
x Security Attribute Based Access Control (ACF) - This family addresses security 
attribute usage and describes the rules for the specific functions, scope of 
control, and characteristics of access control policies.  
x Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor (DAU) - This family describes the 
requirements to provide a guarantee of the validity of information transfers in the 
STOE.
x Export of User Data without Security Attributes (ETC) - This family defines 
functions for exporting user data from the STOE such that its security attributes 
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and protection either can be explicitly preserved or can be ignored once it has 
been exported.  
x Subset Information Flow Control (IFC) - This family identifies the information flow 
control security function policies, which define the scope of control for the 
identified information flow control portion of the TSP.
x Simple Security Attributes (IFF) - This family describes the rules for specific 
functions that can implement the information flow control security function 
policies. 
x Data Exchange Integrity (UIT)  - This family defines the requirements for 
providing integrity for user data in transit between the TSF and another trusted IT 
source/destination and recovering from detectable errors. 
3.5.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.5.2.1 Subset Access Control, Security Attributes Based Access Control, and 
Data Exchange Integrity 
The CIDX cyber-security standard provides strong guidance for access control and data 
exchange integrity and, therefore, meets the access control and data exchange integrity 
requirements of the Framework.
The standard provides best practices and guidelines for an administrative process for 
the creation of all user accounts.  It recommends that the accounts be role-based and 
grant the user only those privileges and access to resources that are necessary to 
perform the particular job function.  The account administration process includes 
principles to separate the duties of the approvers and implementers of account 
configuration.
The standard also specifies that rules should be established to confirm that user access 
to systems and data is controlled.  The standard states that rules generally should be 
applied to roles or groups of users who should only have access to systems and data 
that are required to meet defined business requirements. For data exchange integrity, 
the standard strongly recommends that all communications of private information over 
the Internet are encrypted with Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or (if non-web) with 
encryption of equivalent or better integrity.
Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, Export of User Data without Security 
Attributes, Subset Information Flow Control, and Simple Security Attributes 
The CIDX cyber-security standard guidelines are not specific in defining data 
authentication, but instead point to reference standards to define the requirements.
References are made to the following standards: 
x Guidance for Cyber-security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology Process, 
Version 1.0 
x ISO/IEC 17799, Information Technology – Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management, First Edition, Section 9, “Access Control,” 2000 
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x U.S. Chemical Sector Cyber-security Strategy 
x ISA-TR99.00.02-2004, Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and 
Control Systems Environment, 2004 
x ISA-TR99.00.01-2004, Security Technologies for Manufacturing and Control 
Systems, 2004, Section-5, “Authentication and Authorization Technologies.” 
Based on the reference standards, it can be concluded that the standard meets the 
intent of the FDP_DAU requirements. 
The standard provides practical guidance in the export of user data, with or without 
security attributes.  It provides references to practices described in both the BS 7799-
2:2002, Section 4.3, and ISO/IEC 17799, Section 5.2. BS 7799-2:2002, Section 4.3 
describes processes associated with data classification, information safeguarding, and 
document management associated with an information security management system 
(ISMS).  Although the standard defines rules for document management and security 
protocols, it does not describe specific details of communication links and security, per 
Framework requirements.  Based on the reference standards cited, it can be inferred 
that the standard meets the intent of the FDP_ETC requirements. 
The provisions under the subset “Information Flow Control and Simple Security 
Attributes” of the standard does not clearly state details that match the Framework 
requirement in this class; therefore, this area has been identified as a gap in the 
comparison analysis.  The standard does recommend classifying information according 
to sensitivity and criticality.  It recommends employing a simple classification scheme, 
including designations for public, company use, restricted, and confidential types for 
data access and authorization.  Special consideration is given to data protected by data 
privacy regulations.  It recommends that the company workforce, or subsets of the 
workforce, be assigned access to these document classifications, according to their 
need (which relates to their job description).  Based on the interpretation, the standard 
loosely satisfies the FDP_IFC and FDP_IFF requirements.   Therefore, overall, the 
standard partially meets the Framework requirements under this class. 
3.5.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.5.3.1 Subset Access Control, Security Attribute Based Access Control, Data 
Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, Subset Information Flow Control, 
Simple Security Attributes, and Data Exchange Integrity 
Access control to user data is currently limited to the recommendation that 
communication access to data repositories should be protected from cyber attack.  As 
such, the standard partially meets the sub-class requirements. 
3.5.3.2 Export of User Data without Security Attributes 
This class may be addressed in one or both of the following planned AGA 12, Part 1, 
addendums “Protection of Data at Rest,” and “Security Policies.”  This class was 
deemed a gap, pending these forthcoming specifications. 
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3.5.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.5.4.1 Subset Access Control, Security Attribute Based Access Control, Data 
Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, Export of User Data Without Security 
Attributes, Subset Information Flow Control, Simple Security Attributes, and Data 
Exchange Integrity 
There are seven families within this class.  Appendix A of API 1164 describes specific 
authentication requirements for a subject (user, administrator, etc.) to gain access to the 
system, and for a subject to gain access to data residing on the system.  The rules are 
explicitly extended to include both access via communications media and access by 
third parties.  There is a requirement for protecting data that is exported or imported.
Every family requirement of the User Data Protection Class is addressed by one or 
more sections of Appendix A. 
3.5.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.5.5.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control 
Security attribute based access control (FDP-ACF) is addressed in Section 236.907 
(a)(15) which discusses unauthorized access. 
3.5.5.2 Subset Access Control, Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, 
Export of User Data Without Security Attributes, Subset Information Flow Control, 
Simple Security Attributes, and Data Exchange Integrity 
None of the remaining families listed under the User Data Protection class (FDP) in the 
Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  This is probably due to the 
differences in emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in 
which the control systems are used.   
3.5.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.5.6.1 Subset Access Control 
Subset access control (FDP-ACC) is discussed in Section 8.3.3 of TR99-01, which 
addresses security access policy.   
3.5.6.2 Security Attribute Based Access Control 
Security attribute based access control (FDP-ACF) is addressed in some detail in 
Sections 5.1, “Role-based Authorization Tools,” and 9.1.6, “Mandatory Access Control.”
Sections 5, 8.33, and 9.1.6 cover establishing the rule sets governing access between 
the users and the components.  Section 5.1 alludes to explicit authorization and denial 
of access, but does not address this in detail.  In addition, TR99-01 covers requirements 
for blocking all communication, with the exception of specifically enabled 
communication, enforced destination authorization (Section 6.1.4), firewall configuration 
(Section 6.1.6), operator capability to easily configure and monitor the intrusion 
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detection system (Section 8.3.3), configuration of the intrusion detection system 
(Section 8.3.6), and review of rule sets providing protection in light of ever-changing 
security threats (Section 6.1.6). 
3.5.6.3 Subset Information Flow Control 
Subset information flow control (FDP-IFC) is addressed in Sections 5 and 9.1.6, which 
discuss authorization and authentication, in general terms, and providing a control 
administrator.  In addition, TR99-01 covers establishing specific permissions for each 
user, frequent updating of access permissions, and basing roles on location, projects, 
etc., (Section 5.1.1).  Also, it covers associating users with roles and roles with 
permissions (Section 5.1.2), minimizing the amount of external traffic to and from the 
control system, and having information flow only out of the control room (Section 5.1.6).
3.5.6.4 Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, Export of User Data 
without Security Attributes, Simple Security Attributes, and Data Exchange 
Integrity 
None of the remaining families listed under the User Data Protection class (FDP) in the 
Framework document are addressed in the TR99-01.  This is probably due to the 
differences in area of emphasis between the two documents.
3.5.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.5.7.1 Subset Access Control 
Subset access control (FDP-ACC) is discussed in Sections 6, 6.1, and 6.6.6 of 
TR99-02, which address defining and executing a comprehensive program of all 
aspects of security, the commitment of senior management to security, and the 
development of policies on appropriate security clearance levels.
3.5.7.2 Security Attribute Based Access Control 
Security attribute based access control (FDP-ACF) is addressed in Sections 6.7.4 and 
10.2.3, which cover identification, control, and limiting access to sources of hardware, 
software, etc., and  use of proper access controls.
3.5.7.3 Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor 
x Data authentication (FDP-DAU) requirements found in the Framework are not 
addressed by TR99-02; however, it does address the following: 
x Developing policies for network access control (Section 6.6.8.2.3) 
x Developing policies for operating system access control (Section 6.6.8.2.4) 
x Developing policies for application access control (Section 6.6.8.2.5) 
x Developing policies for monitoring system access and use (Section 6.6.8.2.6) 
x Monitoring user access (Section 6.7.4) 
x Identifying or developing policies of modem access (Section 6.6.6) 
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x Identifying or developing policies on remote access (Section 6.6.8.2.7) 
x Developing policies for the review of user access rights and privilege 
management (Section 6.6.8.2.1).
3.5.7.4 Export of User Data without Security Attributes 
Export of user data without security attributes (FDP-ETC) is addressed by Section 6.5, 
which discusses the importance of practical precautions to eliminate malicious in-bound 
information.
3.5.7.5 Subset Information Flow Control, Simple Security Attributes, and Data 
Exchange Integrity 
None of the remaining families listed under the User Data Protection class (FDP) in the 
Framework are addressed in TR99-02.  This is probably due to the differences in area 
of emphasis between the two documents.
3.5.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.5.8.1 Subset Access Control and Security Attribute Based Access Control 
Subset access control, FDP_ACC, requirements are met by CIP-006-1 M3, CIP-003-1 
R1, and CIP-008-1 R1.  The CIP series has been called an effort in documentation, and 
the policies and procedures outlined in FDP_ACC.2.2 are adequately met.  A 
combination of both electronic and physical access controls are used to meet 
FDP_ACC.2.1.  There is a partial match for FDP_ACC.1.1 in CIP-008-1 R1. 
Security attribute based access controls, FDP_ACF, are primarily met by CIP-003-1 and 
CIP-007-1.  The provisions in these CIP sections call for limiting access based upon a 
user’s role, defining what assets a role may access, obtaining management approval for 
asset access, and denying access to an asset that is not needed. 
3.5.8.2 Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, Export of User Data 
without Security Attributes, Simple Security Attributes, and Data Exchange 
Integrity 
The provisions of the NERC CIP standard generally match the requirements of the data 
authentication with identity of guarantor.  For example, CIP-006-1 addresses this from a 
physical access perspective.  However, the requirement to validate non-physical alarms 
is not included.  The incident response procedures outlined in CIP-008-1 R3 are a good 
match for FDP_DAU.2.2. 
FDP_ETC.1.1 is satisfied by CIP-007-1 R10 and M9.  Monitoring information flow is 
implied by monitoring normal system operation.  FDO_ETC1.2, regarding exporting data 
without associated security attributes, is not addressed in the CIP. 
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3.5.8.3 Subset Information Flow Control 
Subset information flow control, FDP_IFF, is not addressed by the NERC CIP standard.
The provisions of the NERC CIP do not include requirements regarding information 
flow, flow extensions, etc., for user data. 
3.5.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.5.9.1 Subset Access Control, Security Attribute Based Access Control, Data 
Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, Subset Information Flow Control, 
Simple Security Attributes, and Data Exchange Integrity 
Although T1.276 provides extensive guidance regarding data integrity, encryption 
algorithms, and user access controls, these requirements were judged to better match 
Framework requirements other than those delineated in these User data protection 
families.
3.5.9.2 Export of User Data without Security Attributes 
None of the T1.276 requirements were judged to best match requirements in this family.
However, a partial match was assigned to this family because closely related T1.276 
requirements that were assigned to other Framework requirements families do provide 
extensive guidance regarding data integrity, encryption algorithms, and user access 
controls.
3.5.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.5.10.1 Subset Access Control, Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, 
Export of User Data without Security Attributes, Subset Information Flow Control, 
Simple Security Attributes, and Data Exchange Integrity 
The AWWA standard does not address these families.
3.5.10.2 Security Attribute Based Access Control 
The AWWA standard suggests that routers be configured to restrict traffic to a small 
number of destinations, as regulated by an Access Control List (ACL), which is a partial 
match in the FDP_ACF category.  It also states that the configuration of HMI logon 
privileges should correspond with the respective responsibility level, which seems to 
match the FDP_ACF family.
38
3.6 Class:  Event Definition (FEM) 
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3.6.1 Family Definitions 
x Event Definition and Identification (EDI) - This family identifies the PCS events to 
be defined and monitored, alarmed, and identified, and it identifies how they 
interact and how events are audited. 
3.6.2 Chemical Sector:  CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.6.2.1 Event Definition and Identification 
The CIDX cyber-security standard provides practices to detect, report, document, and 
investigate incidents, weaknesses, and unrecognized risks.  It recommends establishing 
an incident reporting and investigation program that addresses recording incidents, 
remaining alert to incidents experienced by other organizations, and lessons learned for 
incidents.
This guiding element provides input to the elements of preventive and corrective actions 
in order to successfully manage recovery from incidents, but does not specify 
responses with enough detail to determine if it satisfies the Framework requirements.
Within this class, the standard loosely satisfies the intent of the requirement.  But in 
other cases, the attributes do not match exactly to the Framework cyber-security 
requirements, so these are highlighted as showing a gap in the standard.  Therefore, 
the standard has a partial match with FEM class requirements.
3.6.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.6.3.1 Event Definition and Identification 
AGA 12, Part 1, specifies that an IDS shall include an alarm output that may be used if 
a security event is detected.  However, critical actions and events are not enumerated 
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or defined.  Also AGA 12, Part 1, specifies that a system operator may be alerted in the 
event of a security alarm, but this does not appear to be mandatory.  This class is 
largely unaddressed by the standard and, therefore, the standard does not meet the 
requirements.
3.6.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.6.4.1 Event Definition and Identification 
Many of the provisions of the Framework deal with the expected response to a security-
related event.  There are specific steps mandated when intrusions or other attacks 
occur.  API 1164 requires event monitoring and logging.  It does not specify actions to 
be taken when a security-relevant event failure occurs.  Rather, it focuses on prevention 
of the event.  Therefore, the standard only partially meets the requirements.
3.6.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.6.5.1 Event Definition and Identification 
None of the requirements listed under the Identification and Authentication class (FIA) in 
the Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  No reference to event 
definition or identification was found.  This is probably due to the differences in 
emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control 
systems are used. 
3.6.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.6.6.1 Event Definition and Identification 
None of the requirements listed under the Event Definition and Identification class (FIA)
in the Framework are addressed in TR99-01.  This is probably due to the differences in 
emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control 
systems are used.
3.6.7 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.6.7.1 Event Definition and Identification 
NERC CIP-005-1 specifies monitoring electronic access controls, detecting intrusions, 
and detecting attempted intrusions.  The latter two can be considered events, as 
specified in FEM_EDI.1.1.  The incident response procedures outlined in CIP-008-1 
address alarms, severity, how the alarm is made, etc.  FEM_EDI.1.2 specifies the ability 
to alarm on a parameter setting change (while this level of detail is not included in the 
CIP, it is implied). 
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3.6.8 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.6.8.1 Event Definition and Identification 
T1.276 delineates two requirements (M-55 and M-56) that relate to automated event 
monitoring; however, these requirements differ significantly from those provided in the 
Framework. Requirement (M-55) requires the generation of an alert for accounts that 
have been dormant for a user-defined period of time.  Requirement (M-56) requires 
disabling accounts, other than administrator accounts, that have been dormant for a 
user-defined period of time. 
3.6.9 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.6.9.1 Event Definition and Identification 
The AWWA standard requires that PLC be programmed with a set point of ranges to 
prevent potentially harmful out-of range adjustments from occurring. It also states that 
antivirus software should be installed and configured for daily virus pattern updates on 
all servers and workstations.  The AWWA standard also recommends that the utility 
install an IDS at the internet gateway and regularly audit IDS logs for evidence of 
unauthorized entry.  Although the AWWA standard documents the need to monitor 
events, it lacks any recommendations for alarms based on the monitoring activity.
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3.7 Class:  Identification and Authentication (FIA) 
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3.7.1 Family Definitions 
x Authentication Failure Handling (AFL) - This family contains requirements for 
defining values for the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts and TSF 
actions in cases of authentication attempt failures.
x User Attribute Definition (ATD) - This family defines the requirements for 
associating user security attributes with users, as needed to support the STOE 
security policy. 
x Verification of Passwords (SOS) - This family defines requirements for 
mechanisms that enforce defined quality metrics for password verification. 
x Timing of Authentication (UAU) - This family defines the types of user 
authentication mechanisms supported by the TSF and includes the required 
attributes on which the user authentication mechanisms must be based. 
x Timing of Identification (UID) - This family defines the conditions under which 
users shall be required to identify themselves before performing any other 
actions mediated by the TSF. 
3.7.2 Chemical Sector:  CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.7.2.1 Authentication Failure Handling 
The CIDX cyber-security standard provides details and practices to handle 
authentication failure by prescribing guidelines that require the system to disable a 
user’s account after  five failed login attempts.  The user is instructed to authenticate 
after 15 minutes of inactivity.  This fully meets the Framework requirements. 
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3.7.2.2 User Attribute Definition and Verification of Password 
The standard discusses use of physical token authentication that employs both a 
physical device that must be in the possession of the remote user and knowledge of a 
personal identification number (PIN).  Examples are Smartcard authentication; 
Biometric authentication; and Location-based authentication.  The standard stresses 
authentication rules in general to safeguard the control system from any security 
breach.  However, the standard does not provide any specific details on setting up user 
attributes defined in the Framework requirements.  In addition, there is no mention of 
rules for developing and verifying passwords.   Based on the definition of the criteria, 
there is a gap in the standard in meeting the FIA_ATD and FIA_SOS family 
requirements.
3.7.2.3 Timing of Authentication and Timing of Identification 
The standard partially satisfies the requirements of the timing of authentication and 
timing of identification requirements, as identified by the Framework.  For example, it 
recommends that a standard administrative process be followed for the creation of all 
user accounts.  In addition, the accounts should be role-based and grant the user only 
those privileges and access to resources that are needed to perform the particular job 
function.  The account administration process includes principles of separation of duties, 
with separate approvers and implementers of account configuration.  The CIDX cyber-
security standard requires that the management process include periodic reviews of 
user accounts to make sure the roles, access needs, or users are still correct, and to 
remove inactive and unneeded accounts. 
The CIDX cyber-security standard does not provide any details or discussion on any 
non-forgeable authentication mechanism.  It does not require the control system to be 
able to detect and prevent the use of authentication data that has been forged or 
copied, as stated under the FAU_UAU requirements.  This is a gap in the standard 
because it does not satisfy the overall intent of the FIA timing of authentication in CS 
requirements.
Due to the general nature of the recommendation in the standard for authorization and 
identification procedures, there is not a clear match to the timing of identification 
FAU_UID requirements.  Therefore, this is a gap in satisfying the Framework 
requirements.  In summary, this family is only a partial match to the overall Framework 
requirements.
3.7.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.7.3.1 Authentication Failure Handling and User Attribute Definition 
The Framework anticipates proactive recognition of possible security failures by tracking 
(mapping) the attributes of previous security events.  There is no mention of such 
activity in AGA 12, Part 1.  AGA 12, Part 1, also provides no defensive actions to 
prevent such failures.  In addition, the user attribute requirement is not very well defined 
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in the document.  Use of identity-based and role-based access control were found to be 
unclear and many items, including individual user credential management, 
authentication failure thresholds, actions to be taken upon exceeding such thresholds, 
and individual user security attribute list maintenance, are not addressed.  Therefore, 
the standard has a gap in fulfilling the family requirements. 
3.7.3.2 Timing of Authentication 
AGA 12, Part 1, requires unique identification of operators performing configuration 
management (CM) or requesting services.  However, actions allowed prior to 
authentication, such as forged authentication information and single-use authentication 
mechanisms, are not addressed.  Therefore, the standard has a partial match with the 
requirements of this family. 
3.7.3.3 Timing of Identification and Verification of Passwords 
AGA 12, Part 1, does specify that components shall uniquely identify operators 
performing CM or requesting services.  Also, compliance with FIPS 140-2 requires that 
feedback of authentication data to an operator be obscured during authentication.  The 
standard provides some information on the generation and verification of passwords.
Thus, the standard partially matches the requirements of these families. 
3.7.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.7.4.1 Authentication Failure Handling and Timing of Authentication 
API 1164 complies with most of the requirements for user attribute verification and 
password verification.  It is extremely detailed in its requirements for passwords and the 
verification procedures.  It does not require detection of fraudulent entry attempts, only 
prevention.  It also does not require detection of forged authentications.  Due to these 
limitations, the standard only partially meets these requirements. 
3.7.4.2 User Attribute Definition, Verification of Passwords, and Timing of 
Identification
API 1164 complies with the requirements for user attribute verification and password 
verification.  It is extremely detailed in its requirements for passwords and the 
verification procedures.  Thus, the standard fully meets the requirements.
3.7.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.7.5.1 Authentication Failure Handling, User Attribute Definition, Verification of 
Passwords, Timing of Authentication, and Timing of Identification 
None of the requirements listed under the Identification and Authentication class (FIA) in 
the Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  No reference to 
authentication or identification was found.  This is probably due to the differences in 
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emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control 
systems are used.
3.7.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.7.6.1 Verification of Passwords 
Verification of passwords (FIA-SOS) is discussed in Section 5.2 of TR99-01, which 
addresses passwords but uses a different approach than is used in the Framework.
Section 5.2.6 indicates that passwords should have appropriate length and entropy.
Section 5.2.2 addresses passwords and user authorization.  In addition, Sections 5.23, 
5.26, and 9.16 discuss password protection, use, care, and use with other forms of 
authentication.  Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.6 discuss other forms of authentication, 
including physical token, smart card, and biometric.  These areas are not covered in the 
Framework.
3.7.6.2 Timing of Identification 
Although timing of authentication (FIA-UAU) is addressed in Section 5.2.3 of TR99-01, 
which covers weakness in third-party eavesdropping, it was not covered in sufficient 
detail to be considered as partial coverage.  In addition, TR99-01 covers the 
enforcement of secure authentication in gaining access in Section 6.1.4.  
3.7.6.3 Authentication Failure Handling, User Attribute Definition, and Timing of 
Authentication
None of the remaining families listed under the Identification and Authorization class 
(FIA) in the Framework are addressed in TR99-01.  This is probably due to the 
differences in area of emphasis between the two documents.
3.7.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.7.7.1 Authentication Failure Handling 
Authentication failure handling (FIA-ALF) requirements found in the Framework are not 
addressed by TR99-02; however, it does state that a program must identify or develop 
policies on authentication (Section 6.6.6).
3.7.7.2 Timing of Authentication 
Timing of authentication (FIA-UAU) requirements found in the Framework is not 
addressed by TR99-02; however, it does state that policies for user password 
management should be developed (Section 6.6.8.2.1) and that a program team must 
identify or develop policies on passwords and authentication (Section 6.6.6).
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3.7.7.3 Timing of Identification 
Timing of identification (FIA-UID) is addressed in Section 6.7.4, although not in sufficient 
detail, which requires the identification, control, and limitation of access to sources of 
hardware, software, spare parts, patches, and service packs used for system 
development, testing, and installation. 
3.7.7.4 User Attribute Definition and Verification of Passwords 
None of the remaining families listed under the Identification and Authorization class 
(FIA) in the Framework are addressed in TR99-02.  This is probably due to the 
differences in area of emphasis between the two documents.
3.7.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.7.8.1 Authentication Failure Handling and Verification of Passwords 
CIP-005-1 R5 is a good match for FIA_AFL.1.1.  The provisions in the CIP call for the 
ability to detect unauthorized access attempts for critical infrastructure assets.  This 
provision, coupled with CIP-008-1, provides for the ability to monitor and alarm when 
failed authentication attempts occur. 
CIP-005-1 R4 specifies that the responsible entity shall implement strong procedural or 
technical measures to ensure authenticity of the accessing party.  In addition, CIP-007-1 
R3 specifies a minimum password complexity and specifies that passwords be changed 
on a periodic basis.  Together these satisfy FIA_SOS. 
3.7.8.2 Timing of Authentication 
CIP-005-1 presents the need to authenticate to critical assets.  This matches the first 
part of the FIA_UAU requirements.  However, the CIP falls short of being a good match 
because timing requirements are not addressed.  In addition, forged authentication data 
is not directly addressed. Either this is a gap in the standard, or a partial match. 
3.7.8.3 User Attribute Definition and Timing of Identification 
FIA_ATD.1.1 is not explicitly specified in the NERC CIP document.  A method for 
distributing one-time passwords and the use of secure e-mail is not contained in any 
CIP provisions. 
Timing of identification is a gap in the document; the NERC CIP document does not 
containe any of the CIP device identification provisions.
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3.7.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.7.9.1 Verification of Passwords and Timing of Identification 
T1.276 effectively covers all of the requirements delineated for these two families.  In 
addition, the requirements delineated in T1.276 are more specific than those delineated 
in the Framework.  T1.276, for example, delineates 22 requirements relating to 
password age limits, changing, complexity, reuse, transmission, and storage. 
3.7.9.2 Authentication Failure Handling and Timing of Authentication 
A number of requirements are delineated in T1.276 that match these two Framework 
families.  T1.276 delineates specific requirements regarding system response to login 
failures (M-50, M-34).  Mechanisms for bypassing the login process are explicitly 
forbidden (M-51). 
3.7.9.3 User Attribute Definition 
There are no T1.276 requirements that directly relate to or match requirements within 
this Framework family. 
3.7.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.7.10.1 Authentication Failure Handling, User Attribute Definition, Timing of 
Authentication, and Timing of Identification 
The AWWA document does not address these families.  
3.7.10.2 Verification of Passwords 
The AWWA document only partially addresses the need for strong authentication in 
process control systems.  It does have requirements for appropriate password strength 
rules for user access (i.e., more complex passwords for those with higher access 
privileges, such as administrators).  However, these rules fall short of the FIA_SOS 
family requirement for generated passwords.  The AWWA standard also addresses the 
need to change default passwords.  One requirement is to confirm that every 
administrator password for the operating system and HMI have been changed from the 
default password.  Another similar requirement states to reset all operating systems and 
HMI passwords away from default settings.  Both of these requirements seem to fit into 
the FIA_SOS family as well. 
47
3.8 Class:  Security Management (FMT) 
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3.8.1 Family Definitions 
x Management of Security Functions Behavior (MOF) - This family allows 
authorized users control over the management of security functions and policies 
in the TSF. 
x Management of Security Attributes (MSA) - This family defines authorized users’ 
control over the management of security attributes.
x Management of Trusted Security Function (TSF) Data (MTD) - This family allows 
authorized users control over the management of TSF data and policies mapped 
to data. 
x Access Revocation (REV) - This family addresses revocation of security 
attributes for a variety of entities within a STOE. 
x Time-limited Authorization (SAE) - This family addresses the capability to enforce 
time limits for the validity of security attributes.  
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x Specification of Management Functions (SMF) – This family specifies the types 
of security management functions provided by the TSF. 
x Security Roles (SMR) - This family addresses the assignment of different security 
roles to users, including restrictions and policy mapping of security roles.
3.8.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.8.2.1 Management of Security Functions, Management of Security Attributes, 
Time-limited Authorization, and Security Roles 
 The CIDX cyber-security standard provides guidance for identification and classification 
of assets to help in the definition of the companies’ risk.  It recommends the creation of 
a checklist to group the assets into categories.  It also outlines methods: use of a 
diagram of an application portfolio, a computer system, or a network to guide asset 
management for manufacturing and process control.  The standard also recommends 
use of automated tools (e.g., provisioning and identity management) to manage the 
process of access approval, account creation, suspension, and deletion. The steps 
recommended by the CIDX cyber-security standard loosely satisfy the intent of the 
security attributes, limited authorization, and roles, per the Framework requirement.
Therefore, they are designated as a partial match to the requirements. 
3.8.2.2 Management of TSF Data 
 The CIDX cyber-security standard recommends that on highly critical systems, it is a 
good practice to perform all system management or configuration functions at the 
device (locally), to reduce the potential for a network interruption to cause a problem 
with the control of the process.  The system manager coordinates all changes with the 
operator for the area so that production is not impacted during a configuration change.
According to the Framework requirement, authentication from the origin command 
should be verified before any configuration change can be accepted.  The CIDX cyber-
security standard does not describe details for authenticating configuration change and, 
therefore, this is a gap in the standard, based on these requirements. 
3.8.2.3 Access Revocation and Specification of Management Functions 
 The standard strongly recommends that access accounts be suspended or removed 
and access permissions be revoked as soon as they are no longer needed (e.g., job 
change).  The need for access to critical systems is explicitly reconfirmed on a regular 
basis.  All established accounts are reviewed regularly to ensure they are authorized 
and still in use.  If an access account remains unused for an extended period, the need 
for it is explicitly reconfirmed.  In addition, the CIDX cyber-security standard 
recommends that, based on its risk assessment, the organization develop a disaster 
recovery plan that addresses hardware and software redundancy, etc., which meets the 
Framework requirements for fault tolerance and redundant system installation. 
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 Overall, the CIDX cyber-security standard partially meets the requirements for security 
management functions within this class. 
3.8.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.8.3.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior, Management of TSF Data, 
and Security Roles 
AGA 12, Part 1, requires significant FIPS 140-2 compliance and, therefore, several 
areas of concern related to this family are addressed.  These include cryptographic 
officer role support, cryptographic module security policy requirements, role-based 
access control, authentication initialization mechanisms, discretionary access control 
mechanisms, and association of users with roles.  AGA 12, Part 1, also references 
ANSI Standards X9.69 and X9.73 regarding role-based access control, but neither 
document was available for review in this analysis. 
3.8.3.2 Management of Security Attributes, Access Revocation, Time-limited 
Authorization, and Specification of Management Functions 
Due in large part to the overview nature of AGA 12, Part 1, security management is not 
addressed in the degree of detail set forth in this family.  For example, not all FMT_MOF 
administrative functions are addressed, a comprehensive list of security management 
functions is not provided, roles allowed to modify security attribute values are not 
specified, and dynamic policy mapping is not addressed.  It is anticipated that 
forthcoming parts of the AGA 12 document, implementation of the standard and 
recommendations, will address many of these deficiencies and gaps. 
3.8.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.8.4.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior, Access Revocation, Time-
limited Authorization, Specification of Management Functions, and Security Roles 
API 1164 has very detailed requirements for granting or revoking access.  These 
include considering inactive time, user attributes, authorization level, etc.  The standard 
provisions comply with each of these five families listed, and therefore match very well 
with the Framework requirements.
3.8.4.2 Management of Security Attributes and Management of TSF Data 
These two families deal with the protection of data during configuration change or loss 
of system integrity.  API 1164 meets all the requirements except one.  Specifically, it 
does not address the procedures for mapping security attributes to the associated 
security policies.  Thus, the standard partially meets the requirements. 
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3.8.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.8.5.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior 
Management of security functions behavior (FMT-MOF) is discussed in 
Section 236.907(a)(15), which addresses unauthorized access.
3.8.5.2 Management of Security Attributes 
Management of security attributes (FMT-MSA) is addressed in Section 236.907(a)(15), 
which addresses the enforcement of access.
3.8.5.3 Specification of Management Functions 
Specification of management functions (FMT-SMF) is discussed in 
Sections 236.907(a)(6) and 236.907(a)(8), which covers hazards assessment and 
mitigation.
3.8.5.4 Management of TSF Data, Access Revocation, and Time-limited 
Authorization, Security Roles 
None of the remaining families listed under the Security Management class (FMT) in the 
Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  This is probably due to the 
differences in area of emphasis between the two documents.
3.8.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.8.6.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior 
Management of security functions behavior (FMT-MOF) is discussed in Sections 5 and 
6.1 of TR99-01 which address authentication and authorization technologies and 
dedicated firewalls.
3.8.6.2 Management of Security Attributes 
Management of security attributes (FMT-MSA) is addressed in Sections 5 and 6.1 of 
TR99-01, which address authentication and authorization technologies and dedicated 
firewalls.
3.8.6.3 Management of TSF Data, Access Revocation, Time-limited 
Authorization, and Specification of Management Functions, Security Roles 
None of the remaining families listed under the Security Management class (FMT) in the 
Framework are addressed in the TR99-01.  This is probably due to the differences in 
area of emphasis between the two documents.  
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3.8.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.8.7.1 Management of Security Attributes 
Management of security attributes (FMT-MSA) is addressed in Section 6.7.4, which 
requires the identification, control, and limitation of access to sources of hardware, 
software, spare parts, patches, and service packs used for system development, 
testing, and installation.
3.8.7.2 Security Roles 
Security roles (FMT-SMR) are addressed in Section 6.6.6, which states that the 
program team must identify or develop policies for accounts.
3.8.7.3 Management of Security Functions Behavior, Management of TSF Data, 
Access Revocation, Time-limited Authorization, and Specification of Management 
Functions
None of the remaining families listed under the Security Management class (FMT) in the 
Framework are addressed in the TR99-02.  This is probably due to the differences in 
area of emphasis between the two documents.  
3.8.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.8.8.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior and Management of 
Security Attributes 
The FMT_MOF requirements are primarily addressed by CIP-003-1, CIP-005-1, and 
CIP-007-1.  For example, CIP-003-1 R3 defines the roles and responsibilities of critical 
asset owners, custodians, and users.  This addresses the requirement of FMT_MOF.1.1 
to restrict the ability of authorized personnel to disable/enable. CIP-003-1 R2 addresses 
the need to categorize and protect information. CIP-005-1 satisfies the requirement to 
authenticate users for control system resources.
FMT_MSA requirements are also a good match with the NERC CIP standard. CIP-003-
1 satisfies FMT_MSA.1.1 by requiring authentication and the use of role-based access.
The role-based access method also addresses FMT_MSA.3.1 by providing the user role 
with the most limited level of access.  While user access being the default access level 
is not specifically mentioned, it is implied. 
3.8.8.2 Management of Trusted Security Function Data, Access Revocation, 
Specification of Management Functions, and Security Roles 
Of the three requirements in the FMT_MTD family, the CIP series only addresses one. 
CIP-003-1 R3 outlines the use of user roles to restrict the ability to modify critical assets.
Device to device authorized communication, domains, and data within the domain are 
not addressed. 
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Regarding access revocation, the CIP addresses revoking electronic access (user 
accounts), but does not include revocation for physical access.  CIP-003-1 R5 
addresses account suspension, but is less stringent regarding timeframe. 
Specification of management functions, FMT_SMF, is also a partial match.    CIP-009-1 
R1 addresses the creation of recovery plans and the exercise thereof.  The requirement 
to protect the confidentiality of sensitive assets is not addressed by the CIP.  
Security roles requirements are partially satisfied by the provisions in CIP-007-1.  The 
CIP meets this requirement by associating users with roles to ensure operational 
security.  However, the roles defined in the CIP are user, custodian, and owner; the 
Framework is more granular, identifying roles such as process control engineer and 
security engineer.  The CIP does define a process for approving changes to the 
functionality of critical assets.  Instead of a security engineer, management is 
acceptable for approving changes. 
3.8.8.3 Time-limited Authorization 
The requirements in FMT_SAE for restricting the capability to specify an expiration date 
for any security feature and authorizing security functions after an expiration time are 
not directly addressed in the CIP.
3.8.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.8.9.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior 
T1.276 provides excellent coverage of this FMT family.  In addition, some of the T1.276 
requirements could reasonably be assigned to more than one Family in this Class 
because of wording differences between the Framework and T1.276 requirements.
As with other Classes and Families in the Framework, T1.276 requirements related to 
this family are more specific than the requirements delineated in the Framework.  M-42 
requires the use of access controls and partitions to appropriately restrict user actions 
and access.  Requirements M-57 through M-58 specify who has the authority to re-
enable a login and remove a lockout.  M-59 and M-60 delineate requirements relating to 
configuring systems to automatically log-out after a period of inactivity.  M-62 requires 
strong authentication and cryptographic protection for any physical or logical interface 
that carries management traffic.  M-18 and M-43 require, respectively, that each user ID 
have a unique settable password and that each user have a unique user ID.  M-47 
requires the display to the user of the time and date of the last successful 
authentication.  M-61 specifies that the user role shall remain unchanged during the 
execution and exit from any NE/MS application. 
3.8.9.2 Management of Security Attributes and Security Roles 
T1.276 delineates a number of requirements that relate to the management of security 
attributes and security roles; however, T1.276 provides greater detail than delineated in 
the Framework.  T1.276 details Critical Administrator Actions (M-26) and the System 
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Security Administrator role (M-27 through M-30).  Requirements M-61, M-24, M-25, and 
M-46 delineate a number of requirements relating to user roles.  M-39 and M-40 are a 
close match to FPT_SMR.4.1, requiring that security management actions be properly 
authenticated and executed via trusted channels. 
3.8.9.3 Management of TSF Data, Access Revocation, Time-limited 
Authorization, and Specification of Management Functions 
T1.276 does not cover the remaining families within this class. 
3.8.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.8.10.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior, Management of Security 
Attributes, Management of TSF Data, Time-limited Authorization, Specification of 
Management Functions, and Security Roles 
The AWWA standard does not address these families.
3.8.10.2 Access Revocation 
The AWWA standard makes little mention of security management-related 
requirements.  One requirement requests the immediate removal of a user account from 
the HMI if the account becomes inactive due to voluntary and, especially, involuntary 
termination.  This statement corresponds to family FMT_REV.
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3.9 Class:  Trusted Security Functions (FPT) 
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3.9.1 Family Definitions 
x Failure with Preservation of Secure State (FLS) - The requirements of this family 
ensure that the STOE will not violate its STOE security policy in the event of 
identified categories of failures in the TSF. 
x Availability within a Defined Availability Metric (ITA) - This family defines the rules 
for the prevention of loss of availability of TSF data moving between the TSF and 
a remote, trusted IT source/destination.
x Confidentiality during Transmission (ITC) - This family defines the rules for the 
protection from unauthorized disclosure of TSF data during transmission 
between the TSF and a remote, trusted IT source/destination.
x Detection of Modification (ITI) - This family defines the rules for the protection 
from unauthorized modification of TSF data during transmission between the 
TSF and a remote, trusted IT source/destination.
x Passive Detection of Physical Attack (PHP) – This family defines the 
requirements for automated detection of unauthorized physical access to the 
TSF, including the notification of, resistance to, definition of, and alarm response 
for unauthorized physical access to the TSF.
x Automated Recovery (RCV) - The requirements of this family ensure that the 
TSF can determine that the STOE is started up without protection compromise 
and can recover without protection compromise after discontinuity of operations.  
x Replay Detection (RPL) - This family addresses detection of replay for various 
types of entities and subsequent actions to correct and prevent replay attacks.
x Domain Separation (SEP) - This family ensures that at least one security domain 
is available for the TSFs own execution and that the TSF is protected from 
external interference and tampering by untrusted entities. 
x Strength of Boundary Access Control (SOB) – This family defines physical 
access control to critical locations and equipment within the STOE.
x Simple Trusted Acknowledgement (SSP) – This family defines the requirements 
for acknowledgment of data transmissions, including verification of status of 
transmitted data and receipts for both internal and external TSF data transfers. 
x Reliable Time Stamps (STM) - This family addresses requirements for a reliable 
time stamp function within a STOE. 
x Basic Data Consistency (TDC) - This family defines the requirements for an 
STOE to exchange TSF data with another trusted IT source/destination. 
x Internal Consistency (TRC) - The requirements of this family address the need to 
ensure the consistency of TSF data when such data is replicated internal to the 
STOE.
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3.9.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.9.2.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, 
Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Automated Recovery, Strength of Boundary 
Access Control, Simple Trusted Acknowledgement, and Reliable Time Stamps 
 The CIDX cyber-security standard prescribes practices to establish a disaster recovery 
site somewhere outside normal business facilities that is not impacted by natural 
disasters (e.g., fire, flood, tornado, terrorism).  The standard recommends that business 
owners identify the maximum time their systems may be unavailable before the 
application is transferred by computer operations to the disaster recovery site.  In 
addition, the standard provides recommendations for controls over information 
transmitted and stored to ensure confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and non-
repudiation.  Under the communications, the standard recommends interface methods 
to verify that the requesting device is the correct device to perform the task.  Critical 
interfaces check the Internet protocol (IP) address, multi-port adaptor card (MAC) 
address, and use a secret code or an encryption key to verify that the request is coming 
from the expected device.  The standard does not describe time stamp of record 
requirements, but it is assumed that the log maintains both time and date for all access. 
Access to control rooms is managed by appropriate combinations of entrance control 
technologies and administrative authentication practices.  Therefore, it is concluded that 
the CIDX cyber-security standard has a partial match with the Framework requirements 
for this family. 
 Based on analysis of all the sub-classes, it was found that the standard discusses all 
the protection steps at a very high level, but does not provide specifics steps at the 
component/system level to fully satisfy the Framework requirements under this class.  
Therefore, the CIDX cyber-security standard only partially satisfies the specifics of these 
requirement families. 
3.9.2.2 Replay Detection, Domain Separation, Basic Data Consistency, and 
Internal Consistency  
 The CIDX cyber-security standard does not discuss replay detection, domain 
separation, and basic data consistency.  However, the standard does reference ISO 
and ISA standards.  The standard refers to secure communication practices (encryption 
recommended in the standard), which could be interpreted to mean that consideration 
for domain separation may be included.
 The standard does not provide details or procedures for data consistency and event 
traces.  Under the incident and response section, the standard discusses documenting 
the details of the incident, the lessons learned, and the course of action to prevent 
incident reoccurrence.  Restoration of the system is discussed in the Contingency 
planning section of the standard.  However, due to several areas not being addressed, 
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the CIDX cyber-security standard has a gap in satisfying the core requirements of the 
Framework.
3.9.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.9.3.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Automated Recovery, 
and Replay Detection 
This Family relates to the physical security required to maintain operational integrity for 
the machines and equipment that make the process control (PC) system viable.  The 
provisions of AGA 12, Part 1, address some of the 13 sub-topics within this Family.  For 
example, tamper-evident packaging is required and strong enclosures may be required 
with tamper detection and response mechanisms for removable covers and doors.
However, detection by IT means is not required.  Thus, the standard only partially meets 
the family sub-class requirements. 
3.9.3.2 Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, Domain 
Separation, Strength of Boundary Access Control, Simple Trusted 
Acknowledgement, Reliable Time Stamps, Inter- Basic Data Consistency, and 
Internal Consistency 
AGA 12, Part 1, addresses failure modes, particularly environmentally induced. 
Specifics such as back-up mechanisms are not addressed.  AGA 12, Part 1, requires 
automatic reestablishment of normal cryptographic system operation after non-fatal 
faults.  However, physical attacks on SCADA communications, fail-safe mode details, 
reliable time stamps, and data consistency mechanisms are not addressed.  Replay 
attack mitigation is to be addressed in forthcoming documents.  Thus, the standard has 
a gap in meeting these sub-class requirements. 
3.9.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.9.4.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, 
Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Automated Recovery, Replay Detection, 
Domain Separation, , Strength of Boundary Access Control, Simple Trusted 
Acknowledgement, Reliable Time Stamps; Basic Data Consistency, and Internal 
Consistency
This Class relates to the physical security required to maintain operational integrity for 
the machines and equipment that make the PC system viable.  The provisions of API 
1164 address each of the 13 sub-topics within this Family, and meet the requirements 
for nearly all of them. Only in the category of Passive Detection of Physical Attack is 
there a gap.  API 1164, consistent with its provisions in most other areas, does not 
provide for automatic resistance to physical tampering, and therefore does not meet the 
requirements of FPT_PHP.3.1.  However, overall, the standard closely matches these 
family requirements.
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3.9.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.9.5.1 Automated Recovery 
Automated recovery (FPT-RCV) is addressed in Section 236.907 (a)(19), which 
includes a description of backup methods of operation in the Product Safety Plan.
3.9.5.2 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, 
Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Replay Detection, TSF Domain Separation, 
Strength of Boundary Access Control, Simple Trusted Acknowledgement, 
Reliable Time Stamps, Basic Data Consistency, and Internal Consistency 
None of the remaining families listed under the Trusted Security Functions class (FPT) 
in the Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  This may be due to the 
differences in emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in 
which the control systems are used.   
3.9.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.9.6.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack 
Passive detection of physical attack (FPT-PHP) is discussed in some detail in 
Section 10.1.3 of TR99-01, which addresses daily inspections and audits of highly 
sensitive equipment to ensure adequacy of physical security controls.  In addition, 
TR99-01 covers the protection of personnel (Section 10.1.2), vulnerability assessment 
(10.1.3), physical security plan, hardening of communication lines, physical security 
controls (Section 10.1.4), definition of security perimeters, manned reception areas, 
monitoring of physical access, periodic investigations, location of sensitive equipment, 
isolation of delivery and loading areas from critical areas, inventory of critical assets, 
and implementation of clear-desk policy (Section 10.1.6).
3.9.6.2 Strength of Boundary Access Control 
Physical security (FPT-SOB) is addressed, although not in sufficient detail, in 
Sections 10.1.2, 10.1.4, and 10.16.6 of TR99-01, which cover prevention of 
unauthorized introduction or removal of materials, physical security perimeters, and 
physical barriers.
3.9.6.3 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, 
Automated Recovery, Replay Detection, Domain Separation, Simple Trusted 
Acknowledgement; Reliable Time Stamps; Basic Data Consistency, and Internal 
Consistency
None of the remaining families listed under the Trusted Security Functions class (FPT) 
in the Framework are addressed in the TR99-01.  This is probably due to the 
differences in area of emphasis between the two documents.
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3.9.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.9.7.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State
Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT-FLS) requirements found in the 
Framework are not addressed by TR99-02; however, it does address identifying 
countermeasures for those vulnerabilities that are most immediate (Section 10), 
separating the business LAN from the Manufacturing and Control Network 
(Section 10.1.1), establishing a secure default state instead of an “open” default state, 
and establishing connections only when needed (Section 10.2.3). It also states that 
contingency plans should include procedures for restoring the system from known good 
backups (Section 18.13), establishing corrective action procedures (Section 18.8), and 
maintaining system recovery sources for rebuilding the existing system and previous 
versions (Section 6.7.4).
3.9.7.2 Confidentiality during Transmission 
Inter-TSF confidentiality during transition (FPT-ITC) requirements found in the 
Framework are not addressed by TR99-02.  However, it does address the development 
of policies for communications and operations management (Section 6.6.8.4).  
3.9.7.3 Automated Recovery 
Automated recovery (FPT-RCV) is addressed, although not in sufficient detail, in 
Sections 6.7.4 and 18.9, which discuss backing up vital data and operating parameters, 
and they specify addressing the detailed recovery process to restore both the 
operational and security aspects of the system in the disaster recovery plan.  In 
addition, TR99-02 discusses that written records should be kept of all policies and 
procedures, as well as the results of their application, and that backups or archives 
should be maintained so that system failures or compromise will not destroy records 
(Section 6.6).
3.9.7.4 Strength of Boundary Access Control 
Physical security (FPT-SOB) is addressed, although not in sufficient detail, in 
Section 6.6.8.3, which states that the control and field network segments should be 
strictly physically secured and that the security perimeter for the Manufacturing and 
Control System should be defined, specifying the components that make up the security 
boundary for the system.  In addition, TR99-02 addresses the development of policies 
for security areas, equipment security, and general controls (Section 6.6.8.3).  
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3.9.7.5 Availability within a Defined Availability Metric, Detection of 
Modification, Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Replay Detection, Domain 
Separation, Simple Trusted Acknowledgement, Reliable Time Stamps, Basic Data 
Consistency, and Internal Consistency 
None of the remaining families listed under the Trusted Security Functions class (FPT) 
in the Framework are addressed in the TR99-02.  This is probably due to the 
differences in area of emphasis between the two documents.
3.9.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.9.8.1 Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Replay Detection, and Strength of 
Boundary Access Control 
Passive detection of physical attack and strength of boundary access control are 
addressed by the provisions in CIP-006-1.  This section details physical security 
requirements, including monitoring physical security (R4) and the strength/depth of 
physical protection (R1).  The provisions in CIP-006-1 exceed those in the Framework.
The requirement to detect communication replay is addressed in CIP-007-1 R7, which 
identifies the need to monitor system events that are related to cyber security (i.e., 
message replay). 
3.9.8.2 Failure with Preservation of Secure State 
CIP-008-1 covers incident response and recovery requirements.  The wording from R1 
is:  “The Responsible Entity shall develop and maintain an accurate and adequate 
Cyber Security Incident response plan.”  There is room to enforce preservation of 
secure state within this statement, but the CIP still falls short of requiring state 
preservation.
3.9.8.3 Availability within a Defined Availability Metric, Confidentiality during 
Transmission, Detection of Modification, Automated Recovery, Domain 
Separation, Simple Trusted Acknowledgement, Reliable Time Stamp, Basic Data 
Consistency, and Internal Consistency 
The provisions in the CIP do not address FPT_ITA.1.1, which calls for an alternate 
communication path to a remote, trusted device.  In the electric sector, a redundant 
communication link may be in place to address the need for continuous availability.  
However, this is not a requirement in the CIP. 
Confidentiality during transmission is not contained in the CIP.  The protocols used by 
industry are typically clear text.  The industry focus is availability, not confidentiality, 
leading to the gap in the standard. 
Detecting modification of data to remote, trusted devices with clear-text, 
unauthenticated protocols is a hurdle the electric industry must overcome.  The 
understanding is present in industry that integrity of communication is critical, and this 
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supports the focus on availability.  The CIP does not contain provisions to address 
FPT_ITI.
CIP-009-1 provides the requirements for recovery from critical infrastructure failure.
The provisions in the CIP fail to meet FPT_RCV.3, FPT_RCV.4, and FPT_RCV.5. 
The requirements specified in Domain Separation, Simple Trusted Acknowledgement, 
Reliable Time Stamps, Basic Data Consistency, and Internal Consistency are not 
addressed by any of the requirements or measurements specified in the CIP. 
3.9.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276
3.9.9.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, 
Passive Detection of Physical Attack, Automated Recovery, Replay Detection, 
Domain Separation, Strength of Boundary Access Control, Simple Trusted 
Acknowledgement, Basic Data Consistency, and Internal Consistency 
The Framework delineates an extensive set of requirements relating to these families.
In contrast, T1.276 does not cover this set of Framework requirement families.  T1.276 
is intended to provide a set of management network security requirements for a wide 
variety of communication technologies.  As such, the detailed requirements specified in 
this class may be outside of the scope intended for T1.276.
3.9.9.2 Reliable Time Stamps 
The only requirement delineated in T1.276 that relates to this class is M-38, which 
requires reliable time stamps.
3.9.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.9.10.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State, Availability within a Defined 
Availability Metric, Automated Recovery, Domain Separation, and Strength of 
Boundary Access Control 
Only a subset of the requirements in the Trusted Security Functions class is 
emphasized in this standard.  The AWWA standard requires that the SCADA systems 
should have “fail-over” redundancy, which implies there is always a secure state that 
corresponds to family FPT_FLS.
The standard also requires that the utility should provide a backup method from the 
remote systems similar to family FPT_ITAs requirements in case of a communications 
failure.  Another requirement is to backup SCADA servers and programming 
workstations to tape every night, with the appropriate tapes being stored offsite.  
However, nightly backups are not as stringent as the 1% maximum loss acceptable by 
the FPT_RCV family.  This family also requires backups for system configurations.  The 
AWWA standard requires routine backup of all SCADA programs for PLC, distributed 
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control units, remote terminal units (RTUs), SCADA servers, and similar programmable 
devices.
Family FPT_SOB is primarily focused on the physical security of the PCS.  The AWWA 
contains a number of requirements addressing this area as listed below.
x Install and use a lock with an intruder switch on control panels. 
x Implement restricted access (and policies) to the SCADA control room. Consider 
biometric devices for areas requiring the highest levels of security. 
x Provide a climate-controlled, locked enclosure for SCADA servers and 
networking components. 
x Install safeguards against theft or unauthorized use for laptops used for onsite 
programming of remote PLCs or RTUs.
x Restrict access to the control room (and network/server room) with an entry 
system that stores information about who has entered and departed. 
x Use protective, lockable casing for exposed outdoor RTUs. 
x Use lockable PLC cabinets. 
x Secure SCADA servers in locked, climate-controlled areas. 
x Provide “hardened,” lockable enclosures for all remote control system units. 
3.9.10.2 Confidentiality during Transmission, Detection of Modification, Passive 
Detection of Physical Attack, Replay Detection, Simple Trusted 
Acknowledgement, Reliable Time Stamps, Basic Data Consistency, and Internal 
Consistency
The AWWA requirements do not address these families.  
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3.10 Class:  Resource Utilization (FRU) 
Resource Utilization 
 Degraded Fault Tolerance Limited Priority of Service 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
   
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.10.1 Family Definitions 
x Degraded Fault Tolerance (FLT) - The requirements of this family ensure that the 
STOE will operate correctly even in the event of failures. 
x Limited Priority of Service (PRS) - The requirements of this family allow the TSF 
to control the use of resources within the TSF scope of control by users and 
subjects such that high priority activities within the TSF scope of control will 
always be accomplished without undue interference or delay caused by low 
priority activities. 
3.10.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.10.2.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
The CIDX cyber-security standard partially meets the Framework requirement under 
this class.  For example, the standard recommends that the cyber-security team 
determine the amount of time/resources required for system restoration, location of 
back up files, hardware, frequency of backup, and need for hot spares, etc., to ensure 
critical systems can be restored in the event of a disaster situation.  The conclusion 
based on the language and terminology under this class is that the standard partially 
meets the intent of the fault-tolerance backup system provisions of the FRU_PRS that 
require the companies to ensure that the STOE will maintain correct operation even in 
the event of failures. 
3.10.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.10.3.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
This class deals with the challenge of maintaining operations when confronted with 
degraded service levels or partial failures.  AGA 12, Part 1, does not deal with these 
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contingencies.  This is probably due to the fact that transmission and distribution 
systems and the SCADA systems that monitor and control them are designed to be fault 
tolerant and already include priority-of-service mechanisms.  AGA 12, Part 1, is 
primarily concerned with securing ongoing data communications on SCADA channels.
Good SCADA design involves eliminating single points of failure.  Therefore, in many 
cases when a primary communication channel fails, a separate alternate channel 
independently secured by AGA 12 mechanisms will automatically provide operations 
continuity.  For failed channels, AGA 12 is irrelevant. 
However, it should be noted that AGA 12 mechanisms must be designed to deal with 
common causes of channel failures and must not impede restoration efforts and 
reestablishing communication.  For example, cryptographic mechanisms must deal 
efficiently with communication noise issues that frequently degrade channel 
performance.  If they do not, the mechanisms themselves can easily become the cause 
of channel failure.  Such fundamental design flaws should quickly be identified in field 
tests and would be corrected long before being deployed in a production environment. 
3.10.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.10.4.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
This class deals with the challenge of maintaining operations when confronted with 
degraded service levels or partial failures.  API 1164 deals with these contingencies by 
establishing backup requirements that are commensurate with the criticality of the 
operation.  It also establishes priorities for the various operations, in accordance with 
their criticality, and for the subjects that will have access to the system in order to 
perform these operations.  These procedures are mandated to be part of the system, 
but may not be automated.  The standard fully meets the Framework requirements. 
3.10.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.10.5.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
None of the requirements listed under the Resource Utilization class (FRU) in the 
Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  No reference was found to 
either fault tolerance or priority of service.  This is probably due to the differences in 
emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control 
systems are used.
3.10.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.10.6.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
None of the families listed under the Resource Utilization class (FRU) in the Framework 
are addressed in the TR99-01.  This is probably due to the differences in area of 
emphasis between the two documents.
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3.10.6.2 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.10.6.3 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
None of the families listed under the Resource Utilization class (FRU) in the Framework 
are addressed in the TR99-02.  This is probably due to the differences in area of 
emphasis between the two documents.
3.10.7 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.10.7.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance 
The provisions in CIP-009-1 address the requirements for recovery from events or 
conditions that would necessitate the activation of the recovery plan.  The term “event” 
can be interpreted to be a power outage - making this a good match to the Framework 
requirement.
3.10.7.2 Limited Priority of Service 
Besides identifying when the recovery plan needs to be activated, CIP-009-1 addresses 
who must be involved.  However, it does not contain a requirement for restoring devices 
in a pre-determined, priority order. 
3.10.8 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.10.8.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance and Limited Priority of Service 
No requirements are delineated in T1.276 that are a close or partial match to the 
Framework requirements delineated in the Resource Utilization (FRU) class.  FRU is 
concerned with ensuring the availability of resources.  M-48 is the only resource 
utilization requirement specified in T1.276. However, this relates to the improper use of 
resources by system users, not ensuring the availability of resources.  M-48 specifies 
that systems display an improper usage warning banner before any logical access is 
allowed.  The Framework does not delineate a similar requirement, so this is a possible 
gap in the Framework, itself. 
3.10.9 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.10.9.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance 
The AWWA standard recognizes the need to avoid power failures, so it states that a 
UPS be provided for critical SCADA devices, servers, networking components, and vital 
workstations.  It also states to consider whether or not to use diesel powered generators 
for critical components.  This partially fulfills the FRU_FLT family.  
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3.10.9.2 Limited Priority of Service 
Unfortunately, the standard does not require a methodology to assign priorities to the 
devices in order to determine which are the most critical, which is required to meet the 
FTU_PRS family.  
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3.11 Class:  Target [STOE] Access (FTA) 
Target Access 
 Session Locking Session Establishment 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.11.1 Family Definitions 
x Session Locking (SSL) - This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide 
the capability for locking and unlocking of interactive sessions (e.g., keyboard 
locking).
x Session Establishment (TSE) - This family defines requirements to deny a user 
permission to establish a session with the STOE based on the attributes of the 
user.
3.11.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.11.2.1 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
The CIDX cyber-security standard recommends that a user be required to re-
authenticate after 15 minutes of inactivity for a given session.  After five failed login 
attempts, the system disables the user’s account for 30 minutes.  This helps deter brute 
force attacks.  This practice meets the family requirements of FTA_SSL under the 
Framework.
 The standard discourages use of screen savers for session locking.  The reason 
provided is that screen savers have the potential to interfere with the operator by 
blocking the view to the process and delaying response to an emergency situation.  Per 
Framework requirements under FTA_TSE this represents a gap in the CIDX cyber-
security standard.  In conclusion, the CIDX cyber-security standard partially meets the 
Framework requirements within TOE Access class. 
3.11.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.11.3.1 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
TSF-initiated session management is not addressed in AGA 12, Part 1. 
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3.11.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.11.4.1 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
This Class deals with the requirements for establishing an interactive session and with 
the rules for terminating such a session, once begun.  API Standard 1164 requires that 
only users meeting specific authorization criteria can begin a session.  It also directs 
that a time period of 30 minutes be set as the limit of inactivity before which a session is 
automatically terminated.  This applies to both system- or user-initiated sessions.  In 
practice, the system administrator can determine an alternative time standard.  The 
standard matches the requirements of this class very well. 
3.11.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.11.5.1 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
None of the requirements listed under the Target [STOE] Access class (FTA) in the 
Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  No reference to was found to 
either session locking or session establishment.  This is probably due to the differences 
in emphasis between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the 
control systems are used.
3.11.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.11.6.1 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
None of the families listed under the Target [STOE] Access class (FTA) in the 
Framework are addressed in the TR99-01.  This is probably due to the differences in 
area of emphasis between the two documents.   
3.11.6.2 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.11.6.3 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
None of the families listed under the Target [STOE] Access class (FTA) in the 
Framework are addressed in the TR99-02.  This is probably due to the differences in 
area of emphasis between the two documents.   
3.11.7 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.11.7.1 Session Locking 
The operational needs of the electric industry are in conflict with the session locking 
requirement, and this is reflected in the CIP.  The time-critical nature of the electric 
industry requires that a control center workstation be available at all times.  To this end, 
locking screen savers and separate passwords for operators are not typically used.
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3.11.7.2 Session Establishment 
The operational needs of the electric industry are in conflict with the time requirements 
specified for session establishment.  The CIP was written with the operational needs in 
mind and reflects this by excluding this requirement. 
3.11.8 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.11.8.1 Session Locking and Session Establishment 
T1.276 requirement M-33 closely matches the Framework requirement FTA_SSL.3.1.
However M-33 provides more specific guidance by requiring the system inactivity timer 
to be configurable by the security administrator and the default value to be 60 minutes.
T1.276 requirement M-45 is a partial match to FTA_TSE.1.1 in that it delineates specific 
conditions that will result in a denial of session establishment.  The conditions 
delineated in M-45 differ from those listed in FTA_TSE.1.1.  FTA_TSE.1.1 states that 
the PCS shall deny session establishment based on factors such as day-of-the-week 
and time-of-day.  M-45 specifies that simultaneous sessions by one user shall be limited 
to prevent a single user from consuming all available resources. 
3.11.9 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.11.9.1 Session Locking 
The AWWA standard states the need for an inactivity timeout logout (or proximity 
sensor) to protect the control system if no one is present in the control room — which 
partially fulfills the FTA_SSL family.  
3.11.9.2 Session Establishment 
The AWWA standard does not address this family (TSE).
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3.12 Class:  Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) 
Trusted Path and Channel 
Trusted Path and Channel 
 Trusted Channel 
Mutually Trusted 
Acknowledgement Trusted Path 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
    
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.12.1 Family Definitions 
x Trusted Channel (ITC) - This family defines requirements for the creation of a 
trusted channel between the TSF and other trusted IT source/destinations for the 
performance of security critical operations.
x Mutually Trusted Acknowledgment (SSP) - This family defines requirements for 
mutual acknowledgment of the data exchange between two trusted entities. 
x Trusted Path (TRP) - This family defines the requirements to establish and 
maintain trusted communications from/to users of the TSF.
3.12.2 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
3.12.2.1 Trusted Channel, Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement, and Trusted Path 
The CIDX cyber-security standard does not fully explain the mechanics of implementing 
a trusted channel between the TSF and other trusted IT products for the performance of 
security-critical operations.  The standard recommends that controls over information 
transmitted and stored should be developed to ensure confidentiality, authenticity, 
integrity, and non-repudiation.   Overall, the analysis of the CIDX cyber-security standard 
found that it partially meets the intent of the secure communications FTP class 
requirements.
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3.12.3 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
3.12.3.1 Trusted Channel 
AGA 12, Part 1, addresses this family topic generally by requiring a clearly defined 
trusted path for loading keys and separate data and security parameter ports.  However, 
communication initiation, assured identification of end points, and other characteristics 
are not addressed.  Therefore, there is only a partial match to this Framework family. 
3.12.3.2 Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement and Trusted Path 
Communication initiation, transmitted data status, and details regarding establishing and 
maintaining trusted communications will probably be addressed in a forthcoming AGA 
Standard document.  Until then, a gap in this standard exists. 
3.12.4 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
3.12.4.1 Trusted Channel, Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement, and Trusted Path 
API 1164 provides guidelines for data validity and security. It also requires that the 
security procedures be transparent to the operation of the system.  These are the same 
qualities this Class requires.  The standard matches these requirements very well. 
3.12.5 Transportation-Rail Sector 
3.12.5.1 Trusted Channel, Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement, and Trusted Path 
None of the requirements listed under the Trusted Path/Channels class (FTP) in the 
Framework are addressed in the transportation standard.  No reference was found to 
trusted path or trusted channels.  This is probably due to the differences in emphasis 
between the two documents and the difference in the way in which the control systems 
are used.
3.12.6 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
3.12.6.1 Trusted Channel 
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP-ITC) is discussed in Section 9.1.5 of TR99-01, although 
not in full. It addresses the safe movement of data from the keyboard/mouse to 
applications and from applications to a region of the screen.
3.12.6.2 Trusted Path 
Trusted path (FTP-TRP) is discussed in Section 9.1.5 of TR99-01, which addresses the 
safe movement of data from the keyboard/mouse to applications and from applications 
to a region of the screen.
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3.12.6.3 Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement 
None of the families listed under mutual trusted acknowledgement class (SSP) in the 
Framework are covered in TR99.01 
3.12.7 Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
3.12.7.1 Trusted Channel, Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement, and Trusted Path 
None of the families listed under the trusted path/channels class (FTP) in the 
Framework are addressed in the TR99-02.  This is probably due to the differences in 
area of emphasis between the two documents.   
3.12.8 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
3.12.8.1 Trusted Channel, Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement, and Trusted Path 
The trusted path/channels Framework class primarily addresses the issue of ensuring 
secure remote access.  There are no CIP requirements that address these issues.  In 
fact, certain requirements, such as CIP-005-1 R1.3, with the exception of endpoints, 
exclude the communication link from the scope of the requirement.
3.12.9 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
3.12.9.1 Trusted Channel, Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement, and Trusted Path 
The trusted path/channels Framework class primarily addresses the issue of ensuring 
secure remote access.  Although there are many T1.276 requirements that relate to 
establishing secure channels, none relate specifically to security considerations for 
remote access. 
3.12.10 Water Sector: AWWA 
3.12.10.1 Trusted Channel 
This class is partially covered in the AWWA standard.  There are many statements from 
this standard that seem to fit into the FTP_ITC family, including the following: 
x Utilities should eliminate unauthorized wireless networking. 
x Non-SCADA modems connected to business networks should be coordinated 
with the enterprise IT department to verify security. 
x When telephone lines are used to connect to RTUs from the field, encrypting 
commands should be considered. 
x Encrypt radio traffic between RTUs (or PLCs) to master unit with 
scrambler/descrambler devices. 
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x Provide signal supervision and tamper alarms to detect loss of signal and 
tampering attempts. 
3.12.10.2 Trusted Path 
There are also a number of requirements relating to the family FTP_TRP, most of which 
describe how to secure the computer network.  One requirement states to identify and 
disconnect all connections between the business and control networks that have no 
security controls.  These requirements are listed below: 
x Virtual Air-Gap - Allows one-way data traffic from a control network server to a 
business network server by means of an optical isolator. 
x Dual-homed Server - Directs SCADA process data into a database server via 
one network card on the control side; allows access to the database only from 
the other network card on the business network. 
x Router - Restricts traffic to a small number of destinations as regulated by an 
Access Control List (ACL). A firewall is appropriate here as well, especially if 
control of the Internet gateway is not under the utility IT purview. 
x Firewall - Of particular value in the case where utility IT has no control over the 
enterprise Internet gateway. 
x Consider using a virtual private network (VPN) solution to prevent unauthorized 
access into the enterprise network. 
3.12.10.3 Mutually Trusted Acknowledgement 
The AWWA standard does not address this family (SSP). 
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3.13 Identification of new Framework Cyber-Security 
Classes/Families
The INL Cyber Security Framework was distributed internally for review at Revision 0.9 
and only included security functional requirements (technical requirements related to 
control system components).  Section 4.5 of the Framework document (Rev. 0.9) 
identifies the future incorporation of additional requirements.
The Framework Tool introduced with Framework Rev. 1.0, released in September 2005, 
incorporates 100+ policy and procedure functional requirements. The Framework will 
continue to evolve with the addition of cyber security assurance and functional 
requirements as well as policy and procedure requirements. 
Unclassified Families 
Software
Management 
Control Plan 
Product 
Safety Plan 
Operations & 
Maintenance 
Manual
Records 
Retention 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99 
Electrical Power     
Telecommunications 
Water     
Verification & 
Validation
Risk 
Assessment Hazards Analysis 
Human Factors 
Analysis
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99 
Electrical Power     
Telecommunications 
Water     
 Failure Analysis Testing 
Training & Security 
Awareness Compliance 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99 
Electrical Power   
Telecommunications 
Water  
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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Family Definitions 
x Software management control plan – This family defines requirements for 
managing the software components that are associated with all PCs used in the 
control systems.
x Product safety plan – This family defines requirements for protecting systems 
that provide data that is made available to third parties. 
x Operations & maintenance manual – This family defines requirements for 
keeping and maintaining standing security plans for cyber control systems for 
operators and maintenance personnel. 
x Records retention - This family defines requirements for retaining records of 
critical control system data as well as data access, authentication, security 
configuration information, etc., that may be useful for auditing, forensics, etc. 
x Verification & validation – This family defines more detailed requirements that the 
Framework for data verification and validation processes such as data validation 
and user authentication. 
x Risk assessment – This family defines requirements to assess the relative risks 
and consequences associated with the critical portions of the control systems. 
x Hazards analysis – This family defines requirements for analyzing hazards 
involved with operating and maintaining control systems including hazards that 
may occur with cyber attacks. 
x Human factors analysis – This family defines requirements for analyzing human 
factors involved in both identifying malicious threats and defending them. 
x Failure analysis – This family defines requirements for the process of analyzing 
system failures that occur and likelihood/consequences associated with failures. 
x Testing – This family defines the requirements for validating the competence of 
personnel who administrate, operate, etc. control systems. 
x Training & security awareness – This family defines requirements for equipping 
administrators, operators, etc. with basic security information to be aware of 
security issues and be able to react and respond to security issues according to 
security plans and policies. 
x Compliance – This family defines metrics for compliance for the classes and 
families of requirements delineated in the Framework in such a way which 
administrators and operators, etc. can measure how secure products and 
components in control system are relative to the Framework. 
Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
The Classes and Families delineated in the Framework provide good coverage for the 
requirements delineated in T1.276.  T1.276 requirements that could not be matched 
with equivalent or similar Framework requirements could generally be associated with a 
specific Framework class.  Only one T1.276 requirement could not be matched with a 
specific class.  T1.276 requirement M-48 requires that systems display an improper 
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usage warning banner.  This requirement, to some extent, is a personnel education tool 
and, as such, is identified in this section with “Training”. 
In addition to the requirements specified in the main body of T1.276, Annex B of the 
standard delineates security procedures that are, as stated in the standard, “tutorial in 
nature.”  The procedures included in this annex touch upon a number of the 
classes/families discussed in this section and excluded from the Framework document.
Classes/families that are excluded from both the main body of T1.276, T1.276 Annex B, 
and the framework include: 
 Product Safety Plan 
 Operations and Maintenance Manual 
 Records Retention  
 Human Factors Analysis  
 Failure Analysis  
 Authority/Responsibility 
 Cyber security Management System (Partial match in Framework Requirements) 
 Security Policy (Partial match in Framework Requirements)
 Personnel Safety
 Compliance 
The extent to which T1.276 addresses the remaining classes/families that have been 
identified as excluded from the Framework is addressed below. 
Software Management Control Plan (Not addressed in Framework Requirements, 
partial match in T1.276 Annex B) 
Although T1.276 does not specifically require a software management control plan, the 
standard does delineate a number of requirements relating to the verification of software 
configurations and authentication of the source of software.  As such, the requirements 
could be interpreted as requiring a software plan for effective implementation.  Section 
B.5 of Annex B delineates specific software lifecycle considerations and procedures for 
ensuring secure software installations and configurations.  
Verification and Validation (Partial match in Framework Requirements and T1.276) 
T1.276 provides extensive guidance regarding data integrity, encryption algorithms, and 
user access controls.  Although T1.276 provides a number of requirements relating to 
cryptographic algorithms and user access controls, the standard does not provide 
specific guidance regarding the verification and validation of data.
Risk Assessment (Not addressed in Framework Requirements & Good match in 
T1.276 Annex B)  
Risk assessment is not discussed in the main body of the T1.276 standard.  The 
importance and application of risk assessments is discussed a number of times in 
77
Annex B.  Section B.4.3 discusses the importance of assessing the risk of natural 
disasters, serious accidents, and power interruptions at critical sites.  Section B.5.3.3, 
entitled Risk Assessment, discusses the risk management process as being 
fundamental to information security and the importance of performing a risk analysis for 
each new product or service. 
Hazards Analysis (Not addressed in Framework Requirements & match in T1.276 
Annex B)
Annex B Section B.4.3 of T1.276 discusses the importance of understanding site 
hazards and establishing plans for the response to hazardous material incidents.
Testing (Not addressed in Framework Requirements & match in T1.276 Annex B) 
Annex B Section B.5.3.12 of T1.276 states that testing should be conducted to provide 
assurance that components and security features have been robustly implemented and 
correctly configured. 
Training and Security Awareness (Not addressed in Framework Requirements, 
match in T1.276 Annex B) 
Only one T1.276 requirement, M-48, could not be matched with a specific Framework 
class.  M-48 requires that systems display an improper usage warning banner.  This 
requirement, to some extent, is a personnel education tool and, as such, could be 
associated with training and security awareness.
Annex B Section B.5.3.2 of T1.276, entitled Security Awareness and Training, explicitly 
discusses the importance of maintaining personnel awareness of security policies and 
procedures and the importance of protecting information assets.  This section asserts 
that personnel are often the weakest security link and that training can dramatically 
strengthen this link. 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Organizational Security (Not addressed in Framework CS, partial match in T1.276 Annex 
B)
T1.276 does not address organizational chain of command issues however Annex B 
does include an extensive section, Section B.4 Physical Security Considerations that 
addresses a number of physical security issues including building security, guards, 
locks, and badging.
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x Contingency/Emergency Planning (Not addressed in Framework Requirements, match in 
T1.276 Annex B) 
T1.276 Annex B Section B.4.2.2, entitled Emergency Facilities, discusses the 
importance of assessing the adequacy of emergency facilities such as fire and 
environmental protection systems necessary for the continued operation of critical 
systems.  This section states that emergency facilities are important in the aftermath of 
a security breach.  Section B.4.3 discusses the importance of emergency planning 
within the context of natural disasters. 
Natural Gas Sector:  AGA Report No. 12 
Software Management Control Plan (Not addressed in Framework CS 
Requirements & AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document is deficient in defining requirements for managing the 
software components that are the heart of all PC systems.  This should be interpreted to 
include both the functional software suites controlling the system, and the data captured 
for immediate or future purposes.  As Software Management logically includes Software
Security and Software Maintenance, an appropriate location for such CSRs might be in 
conjunction with the small section referencing Configuration Management.  Software 
Management is also a part of Configuration Management. 
AGA 12, Part 1 essentially recommends implementation of a crypto system to protect 
SCADA communications.  As such, it recognizes that this necessarily entails a collective 
of keys, algorithms, hardware, software and security policies that must be employed to 
apply cryptographic services to this problem.  However, it should be noted that AGA 12, 
Part 1 does not recommend performing cryptography in a purely software environment 
because it exposes cryptographic tools and algorithms as well as keys to potential 
threats such as malicious code or intentional malicious actions by users.
Software development practices are addressed in FIPS 140-2, Appendix B, but as 
information and not normative practices. Also, AGA 12, Part 1 does not specifically 
reference this part of the FIPS document or itself address software management 
control.
Product Safety Plan (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements & AGA 
Report No. 12) 
Essentially all natural gas-related physical operations, including storage facilities and 
pipelines, maintain and abide by a written Product Safety Plan.  Portions of these plans 
require the gathering and retention of data through the PC system.  This data may well 
need to be made available to a more public user group than the bulk of the PC-gathered 
data.  The Framework Document does not provide any guidance in how to maintain 
security while making data available to a select group of third parties.
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AGA 12, Part 1 recommends that cryptographic modules and authentication modules 
installed in field sites be designed for an indoor substation environment as defined in 
IEEE STD™ 1613.  Beyond that it does not directly address product safety. 
Operations and Maintenance Manual (Not addressed in Framework CS 
Requirements & AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document does not require the Control System operator to keep any 
type of manual setting forth the operating structure under which the CS functions.  In 
practice, firms operating a process control system virtually always maintain an 
Operations Manual and a Maintenance Operations Manual (albeit the names may vary, 
and they may be combined).  It is here that all the security plans pertaining to CS 
operations should be gathered.  The Framework Document should stipulate certain 
documents pertaining to cyber security and to the CS plan that should be a part of this 
manual(s).
AGA 12, Part 1 does not address Operations and Maintenance Manuals. 
Records Retention (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements & Gap in AGA 
Report No. 12) 
Every operating company has a comprehensive records retention policy.  The 
Framework Document should set forth requirements for retention of cyber data that 
reflect the best practices currently available in industry.  The requirements include a 
data protection class that discusses data access, authentication and security controls, 
but they do not provide for comprehensive collection of other company records vital to 
the operation of the facility. 
AGA 12, Part 1 does not contain normative records retention specifications.  It makes a 
reference to audit log retention as being appropriately defined in an auditing document.
Verification and Validation (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – Good 
match in AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document, under “User Data Protection and Trusted Security Class”, 
discusses minimal requirements for verifying and validating data gathered for the control 
system pertaining to data authentication and password verification. The standard overall 
does not provide detailed data verification and validation requirements.
AGA 12, Part 1 recommended practices are specifically designed to provide data 
communications that are known to be unaltered by potential attackers and that can be 
authenticated as having originated from valid authorized users. 
Risk Assessment (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match 
in AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Risk Assessment.
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AGA 12, Part 1, Appendix F, makes extensive normative recommendations regarding 
risk assessment and analysis.
Hazards Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Gap in AGA 
Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Hazards Analysis.
There is no mention of Hazards Analysis in AGA 12, Part 1. 
Human Factors Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements & AGA 
Report No. 12)) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Human Factors Analysis.  
There is no mention of Human Factors Analysis in AGA 12, Part 1. 
Failure Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial match 
in AGA Report No. 12) 
Many provisions of the Framework Document pertain to dealing with failures,  and 
documenting the recognition that failures will occur.  It should go a step further and 
stipulate a procedure for failure analysis. This will conceivably aid the operator by 
identifying failure paths, and thereby improve security.
AGA 12, Part 1 recommends that an InfoSec team make use of failure mode analysis, 
but does not specify procedures for doing so. 
Testing (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match in AGA 
Report No. 12) 
Testing, in this context, is meant to refer to verifying Operator qualifications.  The 
Framework Document recognizes numerous types of performance testing that apply 
directly to the system components.  None of these provisions are meant to measure the 
knowledge and competence of the Operator. 
AGA 12, Part 1, Annex H sets forth detailed normative recommendations for a 
cryptographic system test plan including test and evaluation objectives, evaluation 
criteria, functional and performance requirements, operability and interoperability 
testing, test reports and ownership of test results. 
Training and Security Awareness (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements 
– Partial match in AGA Report No. 12) 
While the Framework Document focuses heavily on the security attributes of the ICS, it 
makes no reference to equipping the Operator to recognize and react to potential 
security threats.  Most industry standards acknowledge the existence of insider security 
threats, whether intentional or not. The Framework document should as well. 
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AGA 12, Part 1 recognizes the importance of personnel training in maintaining a secure 
system, and addresses it in Annex F: Cyber security practice fundamentals.   Formal 
documents are recommended including the following: 
x A malicious code protection document defining the procedures for how and what 
software may be loaded on to systems and networks, requirements for scanning 
tools, updates to scanning tools, employee training and awareness, violation 
enforcement, and recovery procedures. 
x A personal cyber security document defines the policy and procedures for 
personnel hiring and termination, including background checks, security 
clearances, signed agreements, account management, and training and 
education. 
x An education training and awareness document defines the policy and 
procedures for initial and periodic review of security policies, standard operating 
procedures, and security trends and vulnerabilities. 
Organizational Security (Not addressed in Framework CS & Partial Gap in AGA 
Report No. 12) 
Organizational security, in this context, refers to both the physical security of the control 
system and the operational hierarchy (chain of command), from the senior manager 
down to the control center staff and field personnel.  The Framework Document does 
not address either of these concepts, though a stable environment (both physical and 
hierarchical) is necessary for dependable operation. 
AGA 12, Part 1 does not provide normative requirements for physical security, but 
recognizes that cryptography is only effective if it is deployed as part of a 
comprehensive set of cyber security policies, and when it is combined with adequate 
attention to physical security.  It does recommend that cyber security goals and 
standards address both departmental operating requirements and corporate business 
practice requirements and that the security goals and standards be extended to include 
all business partners, contractors, and vendors to ensure consistent treatment of 
information, transactions, and company resources. 
Compliance (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements - Good match in 
AGA Report No. 12)
The Framework Document specifies enforcement of a number of the various sub-
categories within the different families of the matrix of classes.  It fails to stipulate any 
compliance requirements for any of these; these details are left to the system operator 
to define.  The Framework Document should provide more detail as to the level of 
required compliance, what constitutes compliance, and what are reasonable 
consequences for non-compliance. AGA 12, Part 1 establishes specific compliance 
requirements within the document and provides references to FIPS 140-2.  It sets forth 
extensive normative material that is mandatory for the product or system to claim 
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compliance with AGA 12.  Curiously however, it states that it is mandatory that products 
or systems claiming compliance with AGA12 comply with all normative parts or explicitly 
state and characterize areas of non-compliance. 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Authority/Responsibility (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial match 
in AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document addresses authority and responsibility only minimally, and 
then only in the context of the user with respect to proper use of the system.  It ignores 
the area of overall authority and responsibility for the design, maintenance, operation, 
and security of the control system. 
AGA 12, Part 1 requires role-based authentication, defines a User Role, Crypto Officer 
Role and a Maintenance Role and requires that these be provided in the context of 
cryptographic modules.  It also recommends the creation of an InfoSec team with 
clearly defined roles, responsibilities and authorities for information owners, 
organizations and users. 
x Contingency/Emergency Planning (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – 
Partial match in AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document makes a reference to recovery from system failure, which 
involves a type of contingency planning.  However, it doesn't detail any requirements for 
including contingencies for operational security in the system design. It doesn't require 
the system operator to analyze potential security issues and use the analysis to develop 
alternative operating scenarios designed to maintain security and service. 
AGA 12, Part 1 addresses the need for a contingency plan which identifies single points 
of failure, backup and restoration plans and procedures, and man-made or natural 
events that may disrupt an organizations ability to conduct business.  However, it does 
not provide a detailed plan. 
x Cyber security Management System (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – 
Good match in AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework CS requirements for Configuration Management represent a portion of 
what is required for a cyber security management system.  It should also require 
specific proactive security efforts, such as routine scanning for vulnerabilities and self-
assessments of organizational and individual performance.
AGA 12, Part 1 recognizes the importance of proactive security efforts and addresses it 
in Annex F: Cyber security practice fundamentals. 
It makes numerous recommendations including formation of an InfoSec team, self-
assessments and reassessments and development and maintenance of numerous 
formal cyber security documents. 
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x Personnel Safety (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements & in AGA Report No. 
12)
The Framework Document does not address personnel safety considerations.  
AGA 12, Part 1 does not address the subject of personnel safety. 
x Security Policy (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements & in AGA Report No. 12) 
The Framework Document makes multiple references to security violations, which 
implies recognition of an existing security policy.  Nowhere does it set forth any 
requirements or guidelines for what should be included in a security policy for a process 
control system. 
AGA 12, Part 1 specifically recommends that all cyber security goals and standards be 
clearly described in cyber security policies. As a minimum, these policies are to 
describe all cyber security requirements for choosing, installing, maintaining, and 
decommissioning software, hardware and information associated with the cyber portion 
of the company’s control system, including field operation’s systems and networks. 
Each security policy should dictate the responsibilities, practices, and procedures of 
every employee, contractor, business partner, and third party that has access to, or 
performs some type of service affecting a company’s cyber controls. 
A forthcoming addendum to AGA 12, Part 1 will contain a number of sample cyber 
security policies developed for gas, water, wastewater, electric and pipeline SCADA 
systems.  Most of these security policies will be included as Informative, meaning they 
are provided for reference. Some of these policies may be Normative, meaning to claim 
compliance with AGA 12, Part 1 requires the end user and manufacturers to implement 
and adhere to the cyber security policies as written.   End users are encouraged to take 
ownership of the informative policies by reviewing them, modifying them to match their 
corporate needs and culture, and implementing them. 
Oil Sector:  API Standard No. 1164 
Software Management Control Plan (Not addressed in Framework CS 
Requirements – Good match in API Standard No. 1164)
The Framework Document is deficient in defining requirements for managing the 
software components that are the heart of all PC systems.  This should be interpreted to 
include both the functional software suites controlling the system, and the data captured 
for immediate or future purposes.  As Software Management logically includes Software
Security and Software Maintenance, an appropriate location for such CSRs might be 
placed in conjunction with the small section referencing Configuration Management.
Software Management is also a part of Configuration Management. 
API Standard No. 1164 includes extensive provisions for managing software, for in-
house developed and for commercial software applications.  It requires inclusion of 
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security standards in all such software, with the level of security commensurate with the 
criticality and sensitivity of the application.  Standards for criticality and sensitivity are 
also established, in another section of API Standard No. 1164.
Product Safety Plan (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial 
match in API Standard No. 1164) 
Essentially all petroleum-related physical operations, including refineries, storage 
facilities, and pipelines, maintain and abide by a written Product Safety Plan.  Portions 
of these plans require the gathering and retention of data through the PC system.  This 
data may well need to be made available to a more public user group than the bulk of 
the PC-gathered data.  The Framework Document does not provide any guidance in 
how to maintain security while making data available to a select group of third parties.
API Standard No. 1164 does not directly address product safety.  It does extensively 
address proper handling of data agreements between owners and contractors, and how 
contractors that access company information are contractually bound to uphold the 
Company’s information security policies. 
Operations and Maintenance Manual (Not addressed in Framework CS 
Requirements and in API Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document does not require the Control System operator to keep any 
type of manual setting forth the operating structure under which the CS functions.  In 
practice, firms operating a process control system virtually always maintain an 
Operations Manual and a Maintenance Operations Manual, albeit the names may vary, 
and they may be combined.  It is here that all the security plans pertaining to CS 
operations should be gathered.  The Framework Document should stipulate certain 
documents pertaining to cyber security and to the CS plan that should be a part of this 
manual (or these manuals). API Standard No. 1164 does not address Operations and 
Maintenance Manuals. 
Records Retention (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – Good match 
in API Standard No. 1164) 
Every operating company has a comprehensive records retention policy.  The 
Framework Document should set forth requirements for retention of cyber data that 
reflect the best practices currently available in industry.  The requirements include a 
data protection class that discusses data access, authentication and security controls, 
but it does not provide for comprehensive collection of other company records vital to 
the operation of the facility. 
API Standard No. 1164 addresses Information Retention in the multiple contexts of 
Change Management; Communications and Network Usage Standards; Information 
Retention Standards; and, System Security Audit and Review Standards.
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Verification and Validation (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – Gap 
in API Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document, under “User Data Protection and Trusted Security Class”, 
discusses minimal requirements for verifying and validating data gathered for the control 
system pertaining to data authentication and password verification. The standard overall 
does not provide detailed data verification and validation requirements. API Standard 
No. 1164 does not address Verification and Validation.  
Risk Assessment (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match 
in API Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Risk Assessment. API Standard No. 
1164 requires risk assessment considerations in several contexts.  It requires risk 
assessment of all operator-owned facilities with regard to controlling entry and access.
It also requires risk assessment to decide the need and complexity of backup facilities.  
It is also prescribed for determining the criticality of an application.  Additionally, its use 
is directed as a preamble to proposed procedural changes in the control operation. 
Hazards Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements and Gap in API 
Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Hazards Analysis. There is no mention 
of Hazards Analysis in API Standard No. 1164.  This could be construed as a particular 
case of risk analysis, but it should be explicitly addressed. 
Human Factors Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial 
match in API Standard No. 1164)     
The Framework Document makes no mention of Human Factors Analysis. There is no 
mention of Human Factors Analysis in API Standard No. 1164.  However, there is a 
section in Appendix A that deals with Personnel Security that touches on such topics as 
what security information is issued to personnel, and how they become accountable.
Topics such as physical security and termination are also part of this category.  The 
overall coverage of the subject is incomplete. 
Failure Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial match 
in API Standard No. 1164) 
Many provisions of the Framework Document pertain to dealing with failures, 
documenting the recognition of reality that failures occur.  It should go a step further and 
stipulate a procedure for failure analysis. This will conceivably aid the operator by 
identifying failure paths, and thereby improve security. API Standard No. 1164 also 
recognizes, and prescribes mitigation methods for, failure.  It does not prescribe Failure 
Analysis. 
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Testing (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial match in API 
Standard No. 1164) 
Testing, in this context, is meant to refer to verifying Operator qualifications.  The 
Framework Document recognizes numerous types of performance testing that apply 
directly to the system components.  None of these provisions are meant to measure the 
knowledge and competence of the Operator. 
API Standard No. 1164 also advocates extensive testing of component and software 
performance.  As is the case for the Framework Document, API Standard No. 1164 also 
does not address Operator testing or competence.
Training and Security Awareness (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements 
– Partial Match in API Standard No. 1164) 
While the Framework Document focuses heavily on the security attributes of the ICS, it 
makes no reference to equipping the Operator to recognize and react to potential 
security threats.  Most industry standards acknowledge the existence of insider security 
threats, whether intentional or not. The Framework Document should as well. 
API Standard No. 1164 recognizes the importance of personnel training in maintaining a 
secure system, and addresses it at numerous points throughout the Standard.  
However, it is somewhat deficient in not specifying or requiring a structured security 
training program for its industry clientele. 
Organizational Security (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good 
Match in API Standard No. 1164) 
Organizational security, in this context, refers to both the physical security of the control 
system and the operational hierarchy (chain of command), from the senior manager 
down to the control center staff and field personnel.  The Framework Document does 
not address either of these concepts, but a stable environment, both physical and 
hierarchical, are necessary for dependable operation. 
API Standard No. 1164 establishes specific requirements for physical plant security.
These requirements are set forth in Appendix A.  It also establishes a requirement for 
defining the authority and responsibility of each of the personnel levels that are involved 
with the operation, maintenance, and restoration of control system functions.
Compliance (Partial Match in Framework CS Requirements – Good Match in API 
Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document specifies enforcement of a number of the various sub-
categories within the different families of the matrix of classes.  It fails to stipulate any 
compliance requirements for any of these; these details are left to the system operator 
to define.  The Framework Document should provide more detail as to the level of 
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required compliance, what constitutes compliance, and what are reasonable 
consequences for non-compliance. 
API Standard No. 1164 establishes compliance requirements with respect to all 
applications, data bases, policies, etc.  It assigns responsibility for ordering and 
ensuring compliance by users.  It also establishes penalties for non-compliance.  It 
requires all employees to report instances of out-of-compliance activities.  Finally, it 
recommends periodic third-party audit of compliance. 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Authority/Responsibility Awareness (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – 
Good Match in API Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document addresses authority and responsibility only minimally, and 
then only in the context of the user with respect to proper use of the system.  It ignores 
the area of overall authority and responsibility for the design, maintenance, operation, 
and security of the control system. 
API Standard No. 1164 is specific in establishing where responsibility lies with respect 
to operation and security of the system.  It also requires that specific cyber security 
roles, responsibilities and authorities be clearly defined for managers, system 
administrators, and users. 
x Contingency/Emergency Planning (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good 
Match in API Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document makes a reference to recovery from system failure, which 
involves a type of contingency planning.  However, it doesn't detail any requirements for 
including contingencies for operational security in the system design. It doesn't require 
the system operator to analyze potential security issues and use the analysis to develop 
alternative operating scenarios designed to maintain security and service. 
API Standard No. 1164 addresses both the need for a predetermined alternative control 
site, and the need for addressing and resolving predetermined disruption scenarios.  
Both activities are aimed at preventing or minimizing service disruptions. 
x Cyber Security Management System (Partial Match in Framework CS Requirements – 
Good Match in API Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework CS requirements for Configuration Management represent a portion of 
what is required for a cyber security management system.  It should also require 
specific proactive security efforts, such as routine scanning for vulnerabilities and self-
assessments of organizational and individual performance.
API Standard No. 1164 requires that cyber security roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities be clearly defined.  It also requires Clear identification of cyber security 
requirements.  It also requires that performance standards be established and used for 
regular review.  And it requires accountability of managers, administrators, and users.
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x Personnel Safety (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial Match in API 
Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document does not address personnel safety considerations.  
API 1164 extensively addresses the subject of personnel security, but in the context of 
preventing damage to the control system that might be caused by users or other 
company personnel, whether accidentally or intended.  It addresses personnel safety 
only minimally, in a section that deals primarily with the physical security of the control 
system components. 
x Security Policy (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good Match in API 
Standard No. 1164) 
The Framework Document makes multiple references to security violations, which 
implies recognition of an existing security policy.  Nowhere does it set forth any 
requirements or guidelines for what should be included in a security policy for a process 
control system. 
API Standard No. 1164 stipulates a requirement for a SCADA security policy.  It details 
how it should be structured (with a multi-layered approach). Several specific security 
requirements are listed, along with an additional list of recommendations for inclusion.
Chemical Sector:  CIDX Cybersecurity Standard 
Software Management Control Plan (Not addressed in Framework CS 
Requirements – Good match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework Document is deficient in defining requirements for managing the 
software components that are the heart of all PC systems.  This should be interpreted to 
include both the functional software suites controlling the system, and the data captured 
for immediate or future purposes.  As Software Management logically includes Software
Security and Software Maintenance, an appropriate location for such CSRs might be 
included in conjunction with the small section referencing Configuration Management.
Software Management is also a part of Configuration Management. 
 CIDX Cybersecurity Standard recommends best practices to include security in the 
design, development and maintenance of all IT and process control components. The 
security requirements are specified as part of the front-end design activity and are 
tested as part of the site acceptance test of the system. Security requirements are 
considered and assessed during all maintenance activities on the system. This includes 
system and component configuration changes, operating system level revision 
changes/patches, application revision changes, and general enhancements. The 
standard provides references to the following industry standards: ISO/IEC 17799, 
"Information Technology – Code of Practice for Information Security Management", First 
Edition, 2000; Section 10, "Systems Development and Maintenance", ISA-TR99.00.02-
2004; "Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems 
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Environment", 2004, ISA—The Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society, 
Section 6.9; and, the NIST PCSRF ICS-SPP (National Institute of Standards Process 
Control Security Requirements Forum Industrial Control System Protection Profile) 
issued.
Product Safety Plan (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial 
match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
Essentially all chemical and process industries maintain and abide by a written Product 
Safety Plan.  Portions of these plans require the gathering and retention of data through 
the PC system.  For an example, the companies are required by Federal mandate to 
maintain an MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) for each chemical product used and 
stored in the facility. This data must be easily available to sector personnel, partners, 
responders, and the public user group on a need basis.  Most of the data is available via 
PC and is usually made part of the safety policy and operating product safety plan. 
Although not mentioned in the standard clearly, the MSDS information is usually 
available at the operating facility. The standard does mention the need for proper 
handling and use of all data, sharing, and security agreements between the facility 
owners and contractors. 
 The Framework Document does not provide any guidance in how to maintain security 
while making operational data available to personnel, responders and a select group of 
third parties.
Operations and Maintenance Manual (Not addressed in Framework CS 
Requirements & CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework Document does not require the Control System operator to keep any 
type of manual setting forth the operating structure under which the CS functions.  In 
practice, chemical and process industry members operating a process control system 
almost always maintain an Operations and a Maintenance Manual (albeit the names 
may vary, and they may be combined).  It is here that all the security plans pertaining to 
CS operations should be gathered and included.  The Framework Document should 
stipulate certain documents pertaining to cyber security and to the CS plan that should 
be a part of this manual (or these manuals). The CIDX Cybersecurity does not address 
Operations and Maintenance Manuals specifically in the standard. 
Records Retention (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – Good match 
in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
 Every operating company has a comprehensive records retention policy.  The 
Framework Document should set forth requirements for retention of cyber data that 
reflect the best practices currently available in industry.  The requirements include a 
data protection class that discusses data access, authentication and security controls, 
but it does not provide for comprehensive collection of other company records vital to 
the operation of the facility. 
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 The CIDX Cybersecurity addresses records retention in the information and document 
section of the standard.  The chemical companies are encouraged to use both 
comprehensive information and document management policy for their Cybersecurity 
Management System (CSMS). It emphasizes that information associated with the 
development and execution of a CSMS is important, sensitive, and should be managed. 
Risk analyses, business impact studies, risk tolerance profiles, etc. contain sensitive 
company information and need to be protected. Security controls, philosophy, and 
implementation strategies are other examples. Additionally as business conditions 
change, it is good practice to update analyses and studies. Inherent in this is an 
information classification system that allows information assets to receive the 
appropriate level of protection. 
Verification and Validation (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – Good 
match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
 The Framework Document, under “User Data Protection and Trusted Security Class”, 
discusses minimal requirements for verifying and validating data gathered for the control 
system pertaining to data authentication and password verification. The standard overall 
does not discuss data verification and validation in detail. 
 The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard provides various practices to test and verify all data 
including software patches, etc., under sections “Information and Document”, and 
“System Development and Maintenance”.  
Risk Assessment (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match 
in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Risk Assessment. The CIDX 
Cybersecurity, under section “Risk Identification, Classification, and Assessment”, 
provides great detail concerning best practices used in industry to identify, classify, and 
prioritize risk assessment activities based on criticality. It recommends positioning a 
change management system to identify reassessment criteria based on technology, 
organization or process changes.
Hazards Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match 
in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework Document makes no mention of Hazards Analysis. The CIDX 
Cybersecurity Standard under section “Risk Identification, Classification, and 
Assessment”, provides great detail concerning best practices used in industry to 
identify, classify, and prioritize hazard analysis activities based on criticality.  The 
standard provides steps to develop a comprehensive list of all the critical assets whose 
failure could impact the business. It also recommends assigning a risk level to each 
asset in scope per risk tolerance profile established for the organization. Based on the 
comprehensive list of threats, risk tolerance, and vulnerabilities evaluate the likelihood 
that businesses or manufacturing is exposed to each. 
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Human Factors Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial 
match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
 The Framework Document makes no mention of Human Factors Analysis. There is no 
mention of Human Factors Analysis in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard.  However, there is 
a section “Personnel Security” that deals with employing security responsibilities at the 
recruitment phase, all contracts, and stresses monitoring during an individual’s 
employment. It recommends that recruits should be screened, especially for sensitive 
jobs. All employees and third party users of information processing facilities should sign 
a confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement.  
Failure Analysis (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Partial match 
in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
Many provisions of the Framework Document pertain to dealing with failures, 
documenting the recognition that failures occur.  It should go a step further and stipulate 
a procedure for failure analysis.  This will conceivably aid the operator by identifying 
failure paths, and thereby improve security. 
 The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard provides guidelines under the section “Incident 
Planning and Response” to detect and deter failures and to prepare contingency and 
disaster recovery plans to mitigate and restore system operations within a reasonable 
time. It does not prescribe Failure Analysis specifically. 
Testing (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match in CIDX 
Cybersecurity Standard) 
Testing, in this context, is meant to refer to verifying Operator qualifications.  The 
Framework Document recognizes numerous types of performance testing that apply 
directly to the system components.  The Framework document does not provide rules or 
matrix to measure the competence of the Operator for Cybersecurity breach. 
The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard provide recommendations under the section, “Staff 
Training and Security Awareness” cyber security training component that includes 
defined responsibilities and accountability to the cyber security management system 
(CSMS) team. 
Training and Security Awareness (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements 
– Good match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework document does not have requirements that address cyber security 
training and awareness. The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard recommends that industry 
maintain and review employee competencies against skill requirements, and provide 
training that addresses basic employee work requirements and security awareness. The 
standard provides best training practices for adoption by the industry. 
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Organizational Security (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good 
match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework document proscribes requirements at a control systems level in 
contrast to the CIDX Cybersecurity Standard. This gap could be easily bridged with the 
industry standard by incorporating organizational security practices in the final product 
of the Framework methodology.
 The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard, under the section “Organizational Security”, 
provides companies guidelines to establish organizational security that includes both 
cyber and physical aspects. Companies should establish an organization, structure, or 
network with responsibility for overall security, recognizing there are physical as well as 
cyber components that should be addressed. The standard includes practical guidance 
of the ISO/IEC 17799, Section 4 and includes appropriate input from ISA-TR99.00.02-
2004 to address both traditional information technology (IT) and manufacturing control 
systems.
Compliance (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match in 
CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
 The Framework document proscribes audit requirements at a control systems 
component level in contrast to the CIDX Cybersecurity Standard.
 The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard recommends that companies periodically assess 
their security programs and processes to affirm that required programs and processes 
are in place and working, and to take corrective action as appropriate. The standard 
also emphasizes that in appropriate circumstances, assessments should also apply to 
the programs and processes of other companies with whom the company conducts 
business, such as chemical suppliers, logistics service providers, joint ventures, or 
customers.
 The standard also recommends that management should validate or audit for 
compliance, to avoid breaches of any criminal and civil law, statutory, regulatory or 
contractual obligations, or security requirements. Further, the management should 
validate or audit for compliance to corporate security policies and practices for secure 
and safe operation of its assets. 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Authority/Responsibility (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match in 
CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
 The Framework document does not have requirements that address authority, 
responsibility in context of management policies. The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard 
describes assignment of authority and responsibility under the sections “Cybersecurity 
Management System” and “Security Policy”. These sections address various aspects of 
corporate commitment to establishment, communication, and monitoring of cyber 
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security within the company. They also discuss user responsibility and individual 
accountability in the protection of information and systems. 
x Contingency/Emergency Planning (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good 
match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
 The Framework document does not have requirements that address contingency and 
emergency planning requirements. The requirements under the “Resources” class, 
which discuss backup systems and fault tolerance technology available for timely 
restoration of systems after failure, are the only contingency-related requirements. 
 The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard, under the section “Business Continuity Plan”, 
describes development of contingency and emergency plans to respond to the 
consequences of disasters, security failures and loss of service to a business. It 
stresses that the plans should be structured such that they allow business processes to 
be restored in a timely manner.
x Cyber security Management System (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – 
Good match in CIDX Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework document under Configuration Management requirements discusses at 
the component level capability to prevent and detect the loss of integrity of the process 
control system operational system configuration and capability. It does not discuss at 
policy levels how companies should manage risks, develop security policies, objectives, 
targets, etc. 
 The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard provides emphasis on the Cybersecurity 
Management System and recommends establishment of a management framework 
(i.e., organization) to initiate and control the implementation of cybersecurity within the 
company to include all aspects of business information systems, manufacturing and 
control systems, integration points with business partners, customers, and suppliers. 
x Personnel Safety (Not addressed in Framework CS Requirements – Good match in CIDX 
Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework document does not provide any requirements with reference to 
personnel safety. The CIDX Cybersecurity Standard, under the section “Personnel 
Safety”, recommends that companies address security responsibilities at the 
recruitment phase, include these responsibilities in all contracts, and monitor 
performance during an individual’s employment. The standard emphasizes screening of 
recruits, especially for sensitive jobs. All employees and third party users of information 
processing facilities should sign a confidentiality or nondisclosure agreement. 
x Security Policy (Partial match in Framework CS Requirements – Good match in CIDX 
Cybersecurity Standard) 
The Framework document partially provides requirements that address security policy 
at a component level in terms of authorization, access, authentication, etc. The 
document does not specifically mention establishment at a corporate level that covers 
all aspect of operations as prescribed in the CIDX Cybersecurity Standard. 
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 For example, the CIDX Cybersecurity Standard, under the section “Security Policy”, 
recommends that companies develop overall policies and activities that include security 
policy issues. The activities should include information systems and manufacturing and 
control systems, as well as connectivity with business partners, customers, suppliers 
and other third party entities.
Transportation-Rail Sector 
The transportation sector standard reviewed for this exercise has several requirements 
that are mainly administrative in nature.  These could be broken into families or classes, 
such as Analysis, Documentation and Planning, Training, and Verification and 
Validation. 
Analysis
The transportation standard addresses requirements in the area of Failure Analysis 
(Section 236.915), Hazards Analysis (Section 236.907), Human Factors Analysis 
(Section 236.907 and Appendix E), and Risk Assessment (Sections 236.907 and 
236.909).
Training
Training is a major area addressed in the transportation standard that is not covered by 
the Framework requirements.  The standard requires a training program describing who 
must be trained, the level of training, and specific goals to be met by the training 
(Sections 236.907 and 236.921) 
Verification and Validation 
The transportation standard requires the verification and validation of both the original 
design and any changes (Section 236.905). 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Documents and Planning 
The transportation standard requires an Operations and Maintenance Manual (Section 
236.919), a Product Safety Plan (Section 236.907), a Software Management Control 
Plan (Section 236.18), and Records Retention (Section 236.917). 
Electric Power/Energy Sector: NERC CIP 
In support of the items listed in the above table, the NERC CIP contains the following 
requirements not contained in the framework: 
95
Software Management Control Plan: The Responsible Entity shall implement 
supporting configuration management activities to identify, control and report any 
changes to hardware and software components of Critical Cyber Assets. 
Records Retention: Records retention is covered in multiple requirements and 
measurements.
Verification and Validation: A minimum of identity verification (e.g., Social Security 
Number verification in the U.S.) and five year criminal check is required. 
Risk Assessment: Risk assessment is tied to personnel within the CIP. This standard 
requires that personnel having authorized access to Critical Cyber Assets, including 
contractors and service vendors have a higher level of risk assessment…etc. 
Testing: The recovery plan(s) shall be exercised at least annually. 
Training: Section CIP-003-1 deals with Personnel and Training issues. 
Organizational Security: In multiple areas, the CIP contains verbiage such as: 
The Responsible Entity shall maintain documents identifying the organizational, 
technical and procedural controls for…etc. 
Compliance: Each section of the CIP contains a compliance section that lists 
compliance issues and helps an organization determine their level of non-compliance. 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Authority/Responsibility 
The NERC CIP assigns responsibility to the appropriate management or leadership role 
throughout. An example is: The Responsible Entity shall assign a senior manager with 
responsibility for leading and managing the entity’s implementation and adherence of 
the NERC CIP-002 through CIP-009 Standards. 
x Cyber-security Management System 
The NERC CIP refers to these as Security Management Controls. 
x Personnel Safety 
Personnel safety is not mentioned specifically in the CIP. However, in the following 
definition of critical assets, the CIP does mention public health and safety.  
Those facilities, systems, and equipment which, if destroyed, damaged, degraded, 
or otherwise rendered unavailable, would have a significant impact on the ability to 
serve large quantities of customers for an extended period of time, would have a 
detrimental impact on the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System, or 
would cause significant risk to public health and safety. 
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x Security Policy: Responsible Entities shall document and implement a cyber 
security policy that defines a structure of relationships and decision-making processes 
that identify and represent management’s commitment and ability to secure its Critical 
Cyber Assets. 
Water Sector: AWWA 
The AWWA standard recognizes the need for properly trained employees as it makes 
several statements concerning what needs to be done. It states that training activities 
can result in a higher level of cyber security in the workplace and that training sessions 
help to review security procedures and impart to all employees the importance of 
individual responsibility.  
The training topics specifically mentioned are: 
 Don’t share passwords with others 
 Don’t  write passwords down 
 Don’t set up wireless networks or wired connections between networks without 
authorization
 Password-protect home personal computers (PCs) are to be used to connect to the 
enterprise
 Train network administrators to analyze server and network log files to pinpoint 
unauthorized activity 
 Training operators should be trained to log out of the HMI whenever leaving the 
control room to prevent unsupervised access to the SCADA system 
 Utilities should instruct employees not to divulge user information—especially 
passwords—over the telephone 
 Employees can be made aware of any authorized need for this information and 
asked to report any attempt to elicit password information without the proper 
authorization
This standard does not seem to recognize any of the other excluded classes or families.  
Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
TR99-01 addresses several requirements that are not addressed in the Framework.
For clarification these are grouped below by general areas. 
Data Analysis 
Section 8.4.3 addresses the analysis of control network scanner data. 
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Testing
Section 8.4 discusses the importance of regularly testing and monitoring the state of 
security preparation. 
Training
Sections 10.2.1, 10.2.3, and 10.2.6 address training including training for a particular job 
function, ensuring that each individual is properly trained, that there is a formal training 
program, periodic review of training, and the development of training programs. 
Sector specific classes/family 
x Applications
Section 9.1.5 addresses ensuring that only the application that saved data can open it. 
x Organization 
Section 10.2.1 discusses the relationship between an employee and the business 
organization.
x Company Policy 
There are several requirements dealing with company policy.  These include:  Section 
10.2.1 addresses establishing policies on employee issues such as computer use, etc., 
worker’s rights and responsibilities, obtaining employee personal information, 
background checks, employee behavior and business practices, terms and conditions of 
employment, and disciplinary policies. 
x System Isolation 
Section 9.2.6 addresses the need to isolate communication networks used in 
manufacturing and control systems. 
x System Capabilities 
Sections 6.1.6 and 9.1.5 address system capabilities such as available disk space, 
firewalls, and protection of memory to assure that it can not be modified. 
x Unnecessary Services
Section 9.1.6 discusses the disabling of any unnecessary services. 
x Tools
Sections 8.4.4, 8.4.6, and 8.5 discuss the use of vulnerability scanners on 
manufacturing and control systems and the use of forensics and analysis tools to gather 
data on the network. 
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Cross Sector - ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
TR99-02 addresses several requirements that are not addressed in the Framework.
For clarification these are grouped below by general areas. 
Risk
Section 10.2.4, Complete all vulnerability scans, Section 6.6.5, Every business 
organization should identify its vital information and assets, classify them based on the 
consequences of loss or failure, assign appropriate levels of security protection, and 
assess the vulnerability of its Manufacturing and Control Systems to information loss or 
compromise, Section 7, Define risk goals based on the company’s tolerance level to 
risk, and operational policies that define how security is to be applied to control systems 
should be developed, Section 8.4, Conduct a full risk analysis.  A risk analysis will help 
to better understand vulnerabilities and the appropriate mitigation strategy to reduce 
risk, Section 9, Conduct detailed risk analysis vulnerability assessment of the prioritized 
assets, Section 6.4.1, Define the potential risks for the Manufacturing and Control 
System.
Sector specific classes/family 
x Availability 
Section 6.5 exhaustive pre-deployment testing to ensure high availability of the system 
and emergency actions should not be hampered by requiring password authentication 
and authorization. 
x Business Case 
Section 6.2, In order to obtain funding, it may be necessary to build a business case. 
x Compliance 
Section 6.6.6, the program team must identify or develop polices on legal and regulatory 
compliance 
x Development 
Section 6.6.9, Good security practices must be followed on offline development tools 
and systems as well. 
x Goals
Section 6.4.2, Establish specific goals to address the risks identified. 
x Logical rights 
Section 6.6.6, the program team must identify or develop polices on logical rights 
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x Media handling 
Section 6.6.8.4, Management of removable or attachable computer media, Disposal of 
media, Information handling procedures, Security of system documentation, Exchanges 
of information and software. 
x Performance
Section 6.6.8.5, Ensure that all security features, when taken together, do not adversely 
affect required time-critical system performance and other functions. 
x Principles
Section 6.6.4, the security program should develop or identify principles for process 
control security that balance the needs of both production and corporate security. 
x Program Tasks 
Section 6.4, plan the basic tasks that must be accomplished in developing an effective 
program.
x Scope
Section 6.3, Develop a formal scope that should explain clearly what is to be 
accomplished and when, Section 6.3.1, Assemble the team of people responsible for 
developing the various program elements, including guidelines, processes, and 
procedures. 
x Software updates 
Section 6.5, Security patches cannot always be implemented on a timely basis because 
software changes need to be thoroughly tested by the vendor of the manufacturing 
control application and the end user of the application before being implemented. 
x System assessment 
Section 8, conduct an assessment of the existing system. 
x Unused resources 
Section 6.6.6, the program team must identify or develop polices on unused resources. 
x User registration 
Section 6.6.8.2.1, develop policies for user registration. 
x Virus protection 
Section 10.2.4, Install and configure virus protection software and make sure it is kept 
current.
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
It is evident that there is a trend toward security awareness in all industries and the 
need for control system security measures.  The companies are burdened, today, to 
balance the operational considerations and risks with public safety and return an 
investment to the stakeholders.  The need for security presents operators with 
significant challenges and change control that can ultimately impact the cost of doing 
business.
The Framework can provide a means of improving understanding within industry of the 
potential for system disruption.  An improved Framework will need to be even more 
comprehensive and simpler for the industry to adopt.  Chemical industry members are 
striving hard to make the control systems as safe and secure as they can be.  They will 
continue to develop and improve the standards used by these operators, just as the 
operators will continue to create and revise their proprietary security plans. 
4.1 Chemical Sector: CIDX Cyber-security Standard 
The gaps in the CIDX cyber-security standard relative to the requirements of the 
Framework mentioned here are occasioned by a difference in design philosophies, 
operational considerations, corporate risk profile, and policies, rather than by neglect.
The CIDX cyber-security standard provides best practices and guidance related 
elements of cyber-security protection steps and awareness to include in corporate 
policies, procedures, and practices. 
Based on the analysis of the CIDX cyber-security standard and comparison to the 
Framework Requirements, the chemical industry could benefit from incorporating in the 
standard statements that fill the identified requirements gaps, as follows: 
x Potential Violation Analysis – The CIDX standard should include automated 
means of analyzing system activity and auditing data for possible or real security 
violations.  This analysis may work in support of intrusion detection or automatic 
response to an imminent security violation. 
x Identification and Authentication Rules – The CIDX standard can benefit by 
incorporating guidelines from the Framework for single-use authentication 
mechanisms that require an authentication mechanism to operate with single-use 
authentication data.  This should include stringent creation-of-password
requirements at all user levels. 
x Security Management – The CIDX standard can improve procedures that allow 
authorized users (roles) control over the management of TSF data.  Examples of 
TSF data include audit information, clock, system configuration and other TSF 
configuration parameters. 
x Trusted Security Function – The CIDX standard can benefit by employing rules to 
detect replay for various types of entities (e.g., messages, service requests, 
service responses) and subsequent actions to correct from replay actions.  The 
system should also be designed to protect TSF from external interference and 
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tampering (e.g., by modification of TSF code or data structures) by an un-trusted 
entity.
4.2 Energy - Natural Gas Sector: AGA Report Number 12 
It is likely that many or most of the gaps identified here are due to the fact that AGA 12, 
Part 1, is a background document addressing general requirements and approaches to 
protecting SCADA communications.  Much of the document is informative not 
normative.
The informative portions address a very real need within industry by providing at least 
some of the background information needed to understand current threats to SCADA 
communications and approaches to mitigate those threats.  However, they do not 
provide requirements suitable for a gap analysis. 
The normative portions often do address specific Framework issues and are, therefore, 
conducive to comparison and analysis.  But AGA 12 must ultimately be evaluated as a 
whole.  Part 1 is only the first of several documents, and much of the detail required to 
implement its recommendations is forthcoming. 
Although the effort to produce AGA 12 officially began in 2001, the first of its many parts 
is still in draft in 2005.  This is due to the actual scope of the document, which belies its 
own statement of focus on page 1 of Part 1: 
“The focus of AGA 12 is to address the single issue of cryptographically 
protecting SCADA communications traversing unsecured communication links.  
While AGA 12 focuses only on a single aspect of the total security picture, the 
report authors fully expect that other groups will address the many other 
dimensions of the security issues.” 
AGA 12, Part 1, addresses many of those other dimensions at length.  Moreover, it is 
quite possible that the practices recommended to protect SCADA communications 
against cyber attack are also excessive.  Page 1 of Part 1 contains a succinct design 
statement:
“The recommended practices are designed to provide confidential SCADA 
communications that are known to be unaltered by potential attackers and that 
can be authenticated as having originated from valid authorized users.” 
Widely recognized experts in cyber security and cryptography have pointed out that 
confidentiality may not be required to protect SCADA communications against cyber 
attack.  While a business case might be made for keeping SCADA communications 
confidential, this has not been an industry priority, given the long-standing practice of 
plaintext transmissions. 
The current priority is protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure from cyber attack.  
Removing confidentiality from the AGA 12 design goals and focusing more narrowly on 
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authentication and integrity would likely simplify the problem and expedite practical 
solutions.
4.3 Energy - Petroleum & Oil Sector: API Standard Number 1164 
It may well be that the gaps in API Standard Number 1164 (relative to the requirements 
of the Framework) mentioned here are occasioned by a difference in design philosophy, 
rather than by neglect.  API Standard Number 1164 focuses on defining the 
responsibilities of authority personnel, and also on prescribing the conditions for gaining 
access to the system.  It lists the processes used to identify and analyze the SCADA 
system vulnerabilities to attacks, and provides a comprehensive list of practices 
intended to harden the core architecture. In the section on Personnel Security 
Standards, it addresses numerous procedures aimed at minimizing insider intrusions.  
For the most part, API Standard Number 1164 does not address the contingencies for 
preventing or minimizing losses due to security failures.  It appears to focus on 
preventing system compromise, in which case control of losses may be less of a 
concern.  The Framework takes such intrusions into consideration, and significant 
portions of its requirements are aimed at minimizing losses from intrusions. 
Nevertheless, API Standard Number 1164 could be improved by the inclusion of 
specific requirements pertaining to detecting and countering intrusions.  Some of these 
are:
x Include a section detailing the use of security alarms.  This would appear to be 
basic for such a standard.  Certainly, any SCADA system currently in use 
incorporates them as a routine part of day-to-day operations.
x Discuss the steps to be taken when an intrusion actually occurs.  This would 
provide an operator with a rational defensive procedure. 
x Although it is a more complex procedure, the standard should detail which event 
types to track in order to anticipate potential system attacks.  It should also 
provide guidelines for responding when the potential for an attack has been 
identified.
x Finally, as API Standard Number 1164 already recommends or requires 
encryption for certain activities, it should provide some documentation as to the 
level of encryption required.  It could do this by reference to existing outside 
documents.  Examples of such documents include: 
 FIPS PUB 46-3, The Data Encryption Standard (DES)
 FIPS PUB 197, The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
 AGA Report Number 12, Cryptographic Protection of SCADA 
Communications.  
In summary, API Standard Number 1164 is a very useful tool for all entities within the 
energy industries that operate SCADA systems.  It provides them with a comprehensive 
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guideline for developing a control system security program that is tailored precisely to 
their own needs. 
It is the output of an industry-supported body that expects to continue revising and 
upgrading the details of the standard.  As new versions are released, it will no doubt 
become widely accepted as a resource for use when designing or revising corporate 
security plans.
4.4 Transportation-Rail Sector 
Many of the gaps identified in this report for the transportation sector are due to the 
differences in the intent of the requirements listed in the Framework and those in the 
transportation standard.  Although the transportation standard is prescriptive in nature, 
the security needs of a transportation control system are very different from those of a 
chemical plant or electrical distribution system control system.  The transportation 
standard addresses specific requirements that are specific to railroad control systems.
The control systems for a railroad are mainly manned systems, and the automatic 
portion is there mainly to provide assistance to the operator, rather than to provide 
independent control of the system.
The railroad system does not use the internet for transmission of control signals to the 
same extent as some other sectors and, hence, is not as open to security problems at 
the present.  This situation will probably change as the control systems mature. 
Although the transportation sector standard reviewed for this effort is aimed at a very 
different operation, it could still be improved by considering some of the areas 
addressed in the Framework requirements.  It is not apparent that this standard was 
prepared with any consideration of the type of actions seen recently in which others are 
trying to gain access to the control system.  Although not all of the requirements would 
be applicable, many should be reviewed and considered in order to provide a more 
secure transportation system. 
4.5 Cross Sector ISA-TR99.01 and 02-2004 
The gaps identified between the cross-sector standards and the Framework 
requirements are due to differences in the intent of the two sets of documents.  The 
cross-sector standards are, in fact, technical reports whose intent is to provide 
guidance, while the Framework requirements are meant to be prescriptive. 
In addition, the requirements in the Framework are based on the Common Criteria.  The 
purpose of the Common Criteria is to provide requirements for components.  The 
guidance presented in the cross-sector standard is aimed at systems rather than 
components, thus, there is an entirely different perspective between the two documents.
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Although there are differences in the intent of the two sets of documents, there are 
areas of commonality that should be carefully reviewed by the respective standards 
organizations to determine if there are truly gaps in the requirements. 
4.6 Energy - Electric Power Sector: NERC CIP 
The following text is taken directly from the NER CIP Standard:  
NERC Standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 provide a cyber security Framework 
identifying and assisting with the protection of Critical Cyber Assets to ensure 
reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. These standards recognize the 
differing roles of each entity in the operation of the Bulk Electric System, the 
criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to manage Bulk Electric System 
reliability, and the risks to which they are exposed. 
Business and operational demands for managing and maintaining a reliable bulk electric 
system increasingly require cyber assets to support critical reliability functions and 
processes by which the cyber assets communicate with each other, across functions 
and organizations, to provide services and data.  This results in increased risks to these 
cyber assets. 
This standard requires the identification and enumeration of the critical cyber assets that 
support reliable operation of the bulk electric system. These critical cyber assets are 
identified through the application of a risk-based assessment procedure. 
The standard is quite strong when detailing what needs to be identified and 
enumerated.  Like most standards it is written at a high level and avoids specific 
technical implementation details.  For example, biometric authentication is mentioned, 
but a specific solution suggesting finger print readers is not.  The standard is written 
with requirements, measurements, and compliance issues all clearly identified for each 
section.
4.7 Telecommunications Sector: ANSI T1.276 
Telecommunications represents a broad industry that delivers a wide variety of 
services.  These services require the implementation of a diverse set of communication 
technologies.  As such, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that an all encompassing 
security standard can be promulgated for the telecommunications management plane, 
as a whole.   
The main body of T1.276 provides extensive guidance relating to cryptographic 
algorithms and keys, authentication, and architectural considerations that could be 
implemented across a wide variety of telecommunication technologies.  No 
requirements are delineated for conducting risk assessments, establishing security 
policies, or establishing a security management infrastructure.  Annex B, however, does 
provide “guidance” regarding these issues. 
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Most of the requirements delineated in T1.276 could be matched to some degree to 
similar Framework requirements.  The primary differences between T1.276 and 
Framework requirements were, typically, that T1.276 requirements were more specific. 
The list of T1.276 and the Framework requirements both essentially excluded 
requirements relating to the various aspects of developing and establishing a formal 
security management infrastructure.  Although T1.276 Annex B discusses a number of 
issues relating to security management, requirements are not explicitly delineated in the 
main body of the standard. 
4.8 Water Sector: AWWA 
The American Water Works Association’s Security Guidance for Water Utilities 
document was developed to address a number of unpredictable acts that could hinder 
the operations of water utilities.  Section 5, Cyber Security Management, Operations, 
and Design Considerations, is focused specifically on acts that affect the operations and 
cyber security of a utility’s process control systems.  While this document has been 
reviewed by the WISE Standards Committee and various AWWA utilities, none of its 
language provides any indication that PCS in the water sector require any special or 
additional requirements outside the already accepted enterprise networks security 
requirements for proper operations.
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5. NEXT STEPS 
This task has focused on identifying gaps between a limited set of standards relating to 
several of the critical infrastructure sectors and a framework derived from the Common 
Criteria.  This is only the first step in a process which will require examining additional 
standards and refining the gap analysis process. 
The gaps identified in this report fall into three categories: 1) actual gaps in the 
standards reviewed; i.e., information that should have been in the standard but was left 
out through oversight or misunderstanding, 2) information, although pertaining to cyber 
security, was beyond the identified scope of the standard reviewed, and 3) 
misunderstanding or mistakes of the reviewer of the standard. Although some of the 
gaps identified fall into categories 2 or 3, this information may still be of value to the 
standards bodies in that it may represent areas that need clarification in the standard.
In order for this information to be useful, it must be communicated to the various 
standards bodies, since they are the only ones that can modify the standards.  This will 
require that the standards assessment team communicate these findings to the 
standards bodies through participation in selected user group meetings and standards 
committees, and by presenting the information in technical papers or other 
communication media. 
Because of the scope of this work, it is important that there be a group to coordinate the 
understanding of control system standards between the various critical infrastructure 
sectors, industries, and government bodies.  This group would leverage the 
understanding gained to increase the effectiveness of the standards comparison efforts. 
In addition to assisting the standards bodies in producing better standards, this 
continued effort will assist the DHS in identifying areas where additional work is needed 
and in producing strategic recommendations for enhanced cyber security standards 
development.  These results, when used in conjunction with the published Framework 
requirements, will provide the control system community with the ability to better 
evaluate the level of security needed and how to achieve that level. 
Because of the limited nature of this first effort, the task will need to be expanded to 
include other standards within the sectors already addressed, as well as sectors not 
addressed to date.  There are a great many standards dealing with cyber security, 
therefore, it will be necessary to identify those that have the greatest use and potential 
impact on the industry.
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Appendix A:  Synopsis of Comparison Results 
3.0
Cryptographic Support 
Cryptographic 
Key
Management 
Cryptographic 
Operation
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.1
Security Audit 
Security 
Alarms 
Audit Data 
Generation 
Potential
Violation
Analysis
Audit
Review 
Selective
Audit
Potential
Audit Trail 
Storage
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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3.2
Configuration Management 
Security 
Alarms 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.3
Cryptographic Support 
Cryptographic 
Key
Management 
Cryptographic 
Operation
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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3.4
User Data Protection 
Subset
Access 
Control
Security 
Attribute
Based
Access 
Control
Data
Authentication 
with Identity of 
Generator 
Export of 
User Data 
Without
Security 
Attributes
Subset
Information
Flow
Channel 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 Simple Security Attributes Data Exchange Integrity 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
112
3.5
Event Definition 
Security 
Alarms 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.6
Identification and Authentication 
Authentication 
Failure
Handling 
User 
Attribute
Definition
Verification
of
Passwords 
Timing
of
Authentication 
Timing
of
Identification 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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3.7
Security Management 
Management 
of Security 
Functions 
Behavior
Management 
of Security 
Attributes
Management 
of Security 
Function 
Data
Access 
Revocation 
Time-limited
Authorization 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
Specification of Management 
Functions 
Security 
Roles 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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3.8
Protection of Trusted Security Functions 
Failure with 
Preservation of 
Secure State 
Availability 
with a Defined 
Availability 
Metric 
Confidentiality 
during
Transmission 
Detection of 
Modification 
Passive Detection of 
Physical Attack 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water
Automated 
Recovery 
Replay 
Detection Domain Separation
Strength of 
Boundary Access 
Control
Simple Trusted 
Acknowledgement 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water
Reliable Time 
Stamps
Data 
Consistency 
Internal 
Consistence   
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA 
TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water
      
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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3.9
Resource Utilization 
 Degraded Fault Tolerance Limited Priority of Service 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
3.10
Target Access 
Target Access 
 Session Locking Session Establishment 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
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3.11
Trusted Path and Channel 
 Trusted Channel 
Mutually Trusted 
Acknowledge-ment Trusted Path 
Chemical 
Natural Gas 
Petroleum & Oil 
Transportation – Rail 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-01 
Cross-Sector ISA TR99-02 
Electrical Power 
Telecommunications 
Water 
 = Gap  = Partial Match  = Match 
